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Abstract
We introduce the notion of secure software leasing (SSL): this allows for an authority to lease
software to a third party with the security guarantee that after the lease expires, the third party
can no longer produce any functionally equivalent software (including the original software)
that can be run on the same platform. While impossible to achieve classically, this opens up the
possibility of using quantum tools to realize this notion.
In this work, we initiate a formal study of this notion and present both positive and negative
results under quantum hardness of classical cryptographic assumptions:
• Negative Result: We prove that it is impossible to construct SSL schemes for an arbitrary
class of quantum unlearnable functions. In particular, our impossibility result also rules
out quantum copy-protection [Aaronson CCC’09] for any class of quantum unlearnable
functions; resolving an open problem on the possibility of constructing copy-protection
for arbitrary quantum unlearnable circuits. Our techniques also rule out the existence
of quantum VBB for classical circuits, answering an open problem posed by [Alagic and
Fefferman arXiv’16].
Along the way, we introduce a notion called de-quantizable circuits and present the first
construction of this notion which may be of independent interest.
• Positive Result: On the other hand, we show that we can realize SSL for a subclass of
evasive circuits (that includes natural implementations of point functions, conjunctions
with wild cards, and affine testers).
1 Introduction
Almost all proprietary software requires a legal document, called software license, that governs
the use against illegal distribution of software, also referred to as pirating. The main security re-
quirement from such a license is that any malicious user no longer has access to the functionality
of the software after the lease associated with the software license expires. While ad hoc solutions
existed in the real world, for a long time, no theoretical treatment of this problem was known.
This was until Aaronson, who in his seminal work [3] introduced and formalized the notion
of quantum software copy-protection, a quantum cryptographic primitive that uses quantum no-
cloning techniques to prevent pirating of software by modeling software as boolean functions.
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Roughly speaking,quantumcopy-protection says1 that given aquantumstate computing a function
f , the adversary cannot produce two quantum states (possibly entangled) such that each of the
states individually computes f . This prevents a pirate from being able to create a new software
from his own copy and re-distribute it; of course it can circulate its own copy to others but then it
will lose access to its own copy.
For this notion to be interesting, Aaronson observed that only unlearnable functions can be
copy-protected, since a function that can be learned from its input-output behavior alone can be
pirated by learning the function in the first place, and then redistributing a software with the same
functionality as the original function. In the same work, Aaronson showed how to achieve this no-
tion for arbitrary unlearnable booblean functions in the quantum oracle model, and also proposed
two heuristic candidates to copy-protect point functions in the standard model.
This leaves us with an unsatisfactory state of affairs, with the following questions still open
since 2009:
• Is quantum software copy-protection possible at all for arbitrary unlearnable functions in the standard
model (i.e, without using any oracle) even under computational assumptions?
• Are there simple functions, for which we can construct software copy-protection based on classical
cryptographic assumptions?
In a recent blog post, Aaronson [1] even mentioned constructing quantum copy-protection from
cryptographic assumptions as one of the five big questions he wishes to solve.
OurWork: Secure Software Leasing. Towards understanding the questions above, we formulate
a simpler version that still captures the essence of quantum copy-protection. We term this notion as
secure software leasing (SSL). Roughly speaking, an SSL scheme allows for an authority (the lessor2)
to lease a classical circuit C to a user (the lessee3) by providing a corresponding quantum state ρC.
The user can execute ρC to compute C on any input it desires. But at a later point in time, specified
by the lease agreement, the lessee is supposed to return back ρC to the lessor. After it returns the
state, we require the security property that the lessee can no longer compute C.
In more detail, a secure software leasing scheme (SSL) for a family of circuits C is a collection,
(Gen, Lessor,Run,Check), of quantum polynomial-time algorithms (QPT) satisfying the following
conditions. Gen(1λ), on input a security parameter λ, outputs a secret key sk that will be used
by a lessor to validate the states being returned after the expiration of the lease. For any circuit
C : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m in C, Lessor(sk, C) outputs a quantum state ρC, where ρC allows Run to
evaluate C. Specifically, for any x ∈ {0, 1}n , we want that Run(ρC , x)  C(x). Finally, Check(sk, ρC)
checks if ρC is a valid leased state. Any state produced by the lessor is a valid state and will pass
the verification check.
An SSL scheme is said to be lessor secure if for any (malicious) QPT userA, it holds thatA(ρC)
cannot output a (possibly entangled) bipartite states σ∗ such that σ∗
1
: Tr2[σ∗] 4 passes the lessor’s
1More generally, Aaronson considers the setting where the adversary gets multiple copies computing f and not just
one.
2The person who leases the software to another.
3The person to whom the software is being leased to.
4This denotes tracing out the second register.
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verification (Check(sk, σ∗
1
)  1) and such that the the resulting state, after the first register has been
verified by the lessor, on the second register, σ∗2, can also be used to evaluate C with theRun algorithm,
Run(σ∗
2
, x)  C(x). To see why this security notion protects against pirating, consider the simpler
case where a QPT adversary A, is given ρC, and outputs the state ρC ⊗ σ∗2. Then, the state in the
first register will pass the lessor’s verification since it is the original leased state, but in that case,
the above security definition guarantees that Run(σ∗
2
, ·) does not compute C.
We study the questions stated above but in the context of SSL:
• Q1: Is secure software leasing possible at all for arbitrary unlearnable functions in the standard model
under computational assumptions?
• Q2: Are there simple functions, for which we can construct secure software leasing based on classical
cryptographic assumptions?
Comparison with Copy-Protection. A comparison between SSL and copy-protection is in order.
Informally, a secure quantum copy-protection scheme for C satisfies the property that given C ∈ C,
a software distributor can produce a state ρC along with its own evaluation Run algorithm that
computes Run(ρC , x)  C(x). Copy-protection security guarantees that no user can prepate two
states that also computesC in any possible way from (Run, ρC). That is, given (Run, ρC), no adversary
can output QPT algorithms Run′1 and Run
′
2, along with corresponding states σ1 and σ2 such that
both compute C correctly, i.e. Run′1(σ1 , x)  C(x) and Run′2(σ2 , x)  C(x).
The existence of a copy-protection scheme for Cwould imply the existence of an SSL scheme for
C, as any successful pirateA that can produce σ1 and σ2 given (Run, ρC) such thatRun(σ1, x)  C(x)
and Run(σ2, x)  C(x)would have also broken copy-protection.
We can view copy-protection as protecting against pirating of software that can be evaluated
on any computing platform while our scheme protects against pirating of software for fixed plat-
forms (modeled as Run in our setting). Moreover, SSL requires that the lessee returns the state
back whereas quantum copy-protection has no such requirement. While weaker, there are still a
number of concrete scenarions in which the SSL security guarantee suffices, as we discuss below.
Furthermore, we could hope to construct simpler schemes that highlight what type of computa-
tional assumptions and tools are needed to get copy-protection for different circuit classes.
We list some applications of SSL below.
Limited-Time Software. Any company that owns a proprietary computing platform and desires
to release a special edition program C for its platform for a limited time only can use SSL to achieve
this. Consider the following examples. (1) S.S.L.Inc owns a proprietary operating system, and they
might want to release a program C for their operating system that requires renewing the lease on
a yearly basis. They can then distribute ρC ← Lessor(sk, C), and ask for this state a year later. (2)
Before releasing the full version of C, they might want to allow users to run a beta version of it,
Cβ, in order to test it and get user feedback. Naturally, they do not want people to pirate their beta
versions in order to not have to buy the full version when it comes out. Again, they can lease the
beta version Cβ, expecting the users to return it back when the beta test is over. At this point, they
would know if a user did not return their beta version and they can penalize such a user according
to their lease agreement.
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Recalling BuggySoftware. Consider the scenariowhere a company, say S.S.L.Inc, is actively sell-
ing a feature C to their proprietary computing platform. They soon discover that a bug in C is
compromising the security of the whole platform. If they distributed C by using an SSL scheme,
they can now recall ρC, instead of having to stop running the whole platform altogether. Once the
feature C has been recalled, if everyone returned the software, the platform security is no longer
compromised – since no one can runC in the platformanymore. Anyonenot returning the software
could then face possible legal consequences stated in the license agreement that the proprietary
computing platform had in the first place.
Malicious Former Employees. Any company with employees that use company-owned propri-
etary software might worry that a former employee with malicious intentions kept or sold copies
of the software. To protect against malicious former employees, a company S.S.L.Inc gives its em-
ployees a leased copy ρC of their proprietary software C, which is needed for them to perform
their job. Any employee that quits (or is fired) is required to return ρC. The lessor security would
then guarantee S.S.L.Inc that the employee did not sell a copy of C to a competitor that also uses
the same platform; there are instances where different companies in the same sector use the same
platform (e.g. Bloomberg Terminals).
1.1 Our Results
Given the long history of unclonable quantum cryptographic primitives (see Section 1.3) along
with the recent boom in quantum cryptographic techniques [56, 42, 43, 26, 24, 29, 22, 28, 16, 11],
one might hope that existing techniques could lead us to construct SSL schemes. We show, rather
surprisingly, there exist unlearnable class of circuits such that no SSL exists for this class. Our
impossibility is conditional, we assume the existence of quantum fully homomorphic encryption
schemes and the quantum hardness of learning with errors. Under cryptographic assumptions,
this provides an answer to the questionQ1 stated earlier. While this dashes our hopes of achieving
SSL for any class of unlearnable functions, we can still aim to construct SSL for a restricted class
of unlearnable circuits. We show how to construct SSL for a subclass of evasive circuits (and not
functions), partly answering Q2.
1.1.1 Impossibility Result
To demonstrate our impossibility result, we identify a class of classical circuits C that we call a
de-quantizable circuit class. This class has the nice property that given any efficient quantum im-
plementation of C ∈ C, we can efficiently ‘de-quantize’ it to obtain a classical circuit C′ ∈ C that
has the same functionality as C. If C is learnable then, from the definition of learnability, there
could be a QPT algorithm that finds C′. To make the notion interesting and non-trivial, we add
the additional requirement that this class of circuits is quantum unlearnable. A circuit class C is
quantumunlearnable if given black box access to C ∈ C, anyQPT algorithm cannot find a quantum
implementation of C.
We show the existence of de-quantizable circuit class from cryptographic assumptions.
Proposition 1 (Informal). Assuming the quantum hardness of learning with errors (QLWE), and asssum-
ing the existence of quantum fully homomorphic encryption (QFHE), there exists a de-quantizable class of
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circuits.
We show how non-black box techniques introduced in seemingly different contexts – proving im-
possibility of obfuscation [15, 21, 9] and constructing zero-knowledge protocols [17, 19, 12] – are
relevant to proving the above proposition. We give an overview, followed by a formal construc-
tion, in Section 4.
We then show that for certain de-quantizable class of circuis, there does not exist an SSL scheme
for this class. Combining this with the above proposition, we have the following:
Theorem 2 (Informal). Assuming the quantum hardness of learning with errors (QLWE), and asssuming
the existence of quantum fully homomorphic encryption (QFHE), there exists a class of quantum unlearnable
circuits C such that there is no SSL for C.
On the Assumption of QFHE: There are lattice-based constructions of QFHE proposed by [42, 20]
althoughwe currentlydon’t knowhow tobase themsolely on the assumptionofLWEsecure against
QPT adversaries (QLWE). Brakerski [20] shows that the security of QFHE can be based on QLWE
and a circular security assumption.
Impossibility of Copy-Protection. Since copy-protection implies SSL, we have the following re-
sult.
Corollary 3 (Informal). Assuming the quantum hardness of learning with errors (QLWE), and asssuming
the existence of quantum fully homomorphic encryption (QFHE), there exists a class of quantum unlearnable
circuits C that cannot be copy-protected.
Assuming QFHE and QLWE, this rules out constructing copy-protection for arbitrary classes of
unlearnable circuits, resolving one of the questions stated in the introduction.
1.1.2 Main Construction
Our impossibility result does not rule out the possibility of constructing SSL schemes for specific
circuit classes. For example, it does not rule out being able to construct SSL for evasive functions; this
is a class of functions with the property that given black box access, an efficient algorithm cannot
find an accepting input; that is, an input on which the output of the function is 1.
We identify a subclass of evasive circuits for which we can construct SSL.
Searchable Compute-and-Compare Circuits. We consider the following circuit class C: every
circuit in C, associated with a circuit C and a lock α, takes as input x and outputs 1 iff C(x)  α.
This circuit class has been studied in the cryptography literature in the context of constructing
program obfuscation [54, 38]. We require this circuit class to additionally satisfy a searchability
condition: there is an efficient (classical) algorithm, denoted by S, such that given any C ∈ C, S(C)
outputs x such that C(x)  1.
There are natural and interesting sub-classes of compute-and-compare circuits:
• Point circuits C(α, ·): the circuit C(α, ·) is a point circuit if it takes as input x and outputs
C(α, x)  1 iff x  α. If we define the class of point circuits suitably, we can find α directly
from the description of C(α, ·); for instance, α is the value assigned to the input wires of C.
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• Conjunctions with wild cards C(S, α, ·): the circuit C(S, α, ·) is a conjunction with wild card
if it takes as input x and outputs C(S, α, x)  1 iff y  α, where y is such that yi  xi for all
i ∈ S and yi  0 for all i < S. Again, if we define this class of circuits suitably, we can find S
and α directly from the description of C(S, α, ·).
We emphasize that the notion of searchability is associated with a particular class of circuits and
notwith a function family. For instance, there could be two circuit classes that implement the same
class of functions but one could be searchable but not the other one. We note that Aaronson [3]
proposed candidates of copy-protection in the plain model only for searchable point circuits, al-
though Aaronson doesn’t use the terminology of searchability.
We prove the following result. Our construction is in the common reference string (CRS) model.
In this model, we assume that both the lessor and the lessee will have access to the CRS produced
by a trusted setup. We note that our impossibility result also holds in the CRS model.
Theorem 4 (SSL for Searchable Compute-and-Compare Circuits; Informal). Assuming the existence
of: (a) quantum-secure subspace obfuscators [56] and, (b) learning with errors secure against sub-exponential
quantumalgorithms, there exists an SSL scheme in the common reference stringmodel for searchable compute-
and-compare circuits.
Notice that for applications in which the lessor is the creator of software, the lessor can dictate
how the circuit class is defined and thus would choose an implementation of the circuit class that
is searchable.
A discussion about the primitives described in the above theorem statement is in order. A
subspace obfuscator takes as input a subspace A and outputs a circuit that tests membership of A
while hiding A even against quantum adversaries. This was recently constructed by [56] based on
the quantum-security of indistinguishability obfuscation [32].
While the assumption of learning with errors against sub-exponential quantum algorithms is
non-standard,wefirstly note that classical sub-exponential security of learningwith errors has been
used to construction many cryptographic primitives and secondly, there are no known significant
quantum speedups to solving this problem.
In the technical sections, we prove a more general theorem.
Theorem 5 (SSL for General Evasive Circuits; Informal). Let C be a searchable class of circuits. Assum-
ing the existence of: (a) quantum-secure input-hiding obfuscators [14] for C, (b) quantum-secure subspace
obfuscators [56] and, (c) learningwith errors secure against sub-exponential quantum algorithms, there exists
an SSL scheme in the setup model for C.
An input-hiding obfuscator is a compiler that converts a circuit C into another functionally equiva-
lent circuit C˜ such that given C˜ it is computationally hard to find an accepting point. We later show
how to instantiate input-hiding obfuscators for searchable compute-and-compare functions from
quantum hardness of learning with errors. However, we can envision quantum-secure instanti-
ations of input-hiding obfuscators for more general class of searchable evasive circuits; we leave
this problem open. We also leave open the problem of removing searchability condition from our
result.
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We admittedly use heavy cryptographic hammers to prove our result, but as will be clear in the
overview given in the next section, each of these hammers will be necessary to solve the different
technical challenges we face.
1.2 Overview of Construction of SSL
To construct an SSL scheme in the setup model (Setup,Gen, Lessor,Run,Check) against arbitrary
quantum poly-time (QPT) pirates, we first focus on two weaker class of adversaries, namely, dupli-
cators and maulers. Duplicators are adversaries who, given ρC generated by the lessor for a circuit
C sampled from a distributionDC, produce ρ⊗2C ; that is, all they do is replicate the state. Maulers,
who given ρC, output ρC⊗ρ∗C, where ρ∗C is far from ρC in trace distance and ρC is the copy returned
by the mauler back to the lessor; that is the second copy it produces is a modified version of the
original copy.
While our construction is secure against arbitrary pirates, it will be helpful to first focus on
these restricted type of adversaries. We propose two schemes: the first scheme is secure against
QPTmaulers and the second scheme against QPT duplicators. Once we discuss these schemes, we
will then show how to combine the techniques from these two schemes to obtain a construction
secure against arbitrary pirates.
SSL againstMaulers. To protect SSL against amauler, we attempt to construct a classical scheme.
The reason why it could be possible to construct a classical scheme is because maulers never pro-
duce a pirated copy ρ∗
C
that is the same as the original copy ρC they obtained.
A natural attempt to construct an SSL scheme is to use virtual black-box obfuscation [15] (VBB):
this notion is a compiler that transforms a circuit C into another functionally equivalent circuit C˜
such that C˜ only leaks the input-output behavior of C and nothing more. This is a powerful notion
and implies most of the cryptographic primitives that exist under the sun. We generate the leased
state ρC to be theVBBobfuscation ofC, namely C˜. Thehope is that amaulerwill not output another
leased state ρ∗
C
that is different from C˜.
Unfortunately, this scheme is insecure. Amauler on input C˜, obfuscates C˜ oncemore to obtain
˜˜
C
and outputs this re-obfsuscated circuit. Moreover, note that the resulting re-obfuscated circuit still
computes C. This suggests that program obfuscation is insufficient for our purpose. In hindsight,
this should be unsurprising: VBBguarantees that given an obfuscated circuit, an efficient adversary
should not learn anything about the implementation of the circuit, but this doesn’t prevent the
adversary from being able to re-produce modified copies of the obfuscated circuit. To rectify this
issue, we recognize the following useful properties:
• Explanability: this property says that there does not exist any adverary who given C˜ can
produce a different circuit C˜∗ and simultaneously produce f (C), for some fixed function f ; it
will be soon clear what f is.
• Hardness of Property-Finding: Given C˜, no efficient adversary can find f (C).
Before explaining how these two properties are useful in constructing an SSL scheme, we first iden-
tify the right cryptographic tools to achieve both the above properties.
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Explanability via Simulation-Extractable NIZKs [52, 30]: Towards tackling explanability, we consider
theprimitive of simulation-extractable non-interactive zero-knowledge [52, 30] (seNIZKs). A seNIZK
system is a non-interactive protocol between a prover and a verifier with the prover trying to con-
vince the verifier that a statement belongs to theNP language. By non-interactive wemean that the
prover only sends one message to the verifier and the verifier is supposed to output the decision
bit: accept or reject. Moreover, this primitive is defined in the common reference string model. In
this model, there is a trusted setup that produces a common reference string and both the prover
and the verifier have access to this common reference string.
As in a traditional interactive protocol, we require a seNIZK to satisfy the completeness prop-
erty. Simulation-extractability, a property that implies both zero-knowledge and soundness, guar-
antees that if there exists an efficient adversaryA who upon receiving a simulated proof5 for an in-
stance x, produces an accepting proof for adifferent instance x′ then there also exists an adversaryB
that given the same simulated proof produces an accepting proof for x′ along with simultaneously
producing a valid witness for x′.
Simulation-extractability is quite useful to handle explanability. In addition to giving the ob-
fuscation of a circuit C, if we attach a proof that proves the knowledgeof f (C) (interpreted as anNP
witness) then, if the adversary produces a different obfuscated circuit and a corresponding proof,
we can use the simulation-extractability property to convert this into a different adversary that also
simultaneously produces f (C), as desired.
Hardness of Property-Finding via Input-Hiding Obfuscators [14]: To handle the hardness of property-
finding, we use the primitive of input-hiding obfuscators [14]. An input-hiding obfuscator guar-
antees that given an obfuscated circuit C˜, any efficient adversary cannot find an accepting input x,
i.e., an input x such that C˜(x)  1. Of course this notion is only meaningful for an evasive class of
functions: a function is evasive if given oracle access to this function, any efficient adversary can-
not output an accepting point. The work of Barak et al. [14] propose candidates for input-hiding
obfuscators.
To seewhy this is a relevant tool, let us fix f to be a function that on input C produces an accept-
ing input. Now, if an adversary given an obfuscation of C, produces f (C) then this would violate
the input-hiding property of the underlying obfuscation scheme.
Combining Simulation-Extractable NIZKs and Input-Hiding Obfuscators: We identified two different
tools that solve explanability and hardness of property-finding separately. We now combine these
two different techniques to obtain an SSL scheme secure against maulers. Our SSL scheme will be
associated with searchable circuits; given a description of searchable circuit C, an input x can be
efficiently found such that C(x)  1.
To lease a circuit C, do the following:
• Compute an input-hiding obfuscation of C, denoted by C˜,
5A simulated proof is one that is generated by an efficient algorithm, called a simulator, who has access to some
private coins that was used to generate the common reference string. Moreover, a simulated proof is indistinguishable
from an honestly generated proof. A simulator has the capability to generate simulated proofs for YES instances even
without knowing the corresponding witness for these instances.
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• Produce a seNIZKproof π that proves knowledge of an input x such that C(x)  1. Note that
we can find this input using the searchability property.
Output
(
C˜, π
)
as the leased circuit. To evaluate on any input x, we first check if π is a valid proof
and if so, we compute C˜ on x to obtain C(x).
To see why this scheme is secure against maulers, suppose an adversary A given
(
C˜, π
)
pro-
duces
(
C˜∗, π∗
)
, where C˜∗ , C˜. SinceA is a valid mauler we are guaranteed that C˜∗ is functionally
equivalent to C. We first run the seNIZK simulator to simulate π (at this point, we don’t need x to
generate π) instead; the adversary cannot distinguish simulated versus honestly generated proofs.
Now, we invoke the simulation-extractability property to convert A into one who not only pro-
duces
(
C˜∗, π∗
)
but also simultaneously produces x such that C˜∗(x)  1. Since C˜∗ is functionally
equivalent to C, it follows that C(x)  1 as well. But this violates the input-hiding property which
says that no efficient adversary given C˜ can produce an accepting input.
Necessity of sub-exponential security: There is a subtlety we skipped in the proof above. The maulers
that we consider have multi-bit output which is atypical in the cryptographic setting where the
focus is mainly on boolean adversaries. This causes an issue when we switch from the honestly
generated proof to a simulated proof. Upon receiving the honestly generated proof, A outputs(
C˜∗, π∗
)
such that C˜∗ is functionally equivalent to C but upon receiving the simulated proof, the
adversary outputs
(
C˜∗, π∗
)
where C˜∗ differs from C on one point. FromA, we need to extract one
bit that would help distinguish the real and simulated proofs. To extract this bit, we rely upon
sub-exponential security. Given C˜∗, we run in time 2n , where n is the input length, and check if
C˜∗ is still functionally equivalent to C; if indeed C˜∗ is not functionally equivalent to C then we
know for a fact that the adversary was given a simulated proof, otherwise it received an honestly
generated proof. We set the security parameter in the seNIZK system to be sufficiently large (for
eg, 2n+ω(log(n))) such that the seNIZK is still secure against adversaries running in time 2n . This is
by now a fairly standard trick employed to make primitives sub-exponentially secure.
SSL against Duplicators. Next we focus on constructing SSL secure against duplicators. If our
only goal was to protect against duplicators, we could achieve this with a simple scheme. The
lessor, in order to lease C, will output (|ψ〉 , C)where |ψ〉 is a random quantum state generated by
applying a random polynomial sized quantum circuit U on input |0⊗λ〉. Run on input (|ψ〉 , C, x)
ignores the quantum state |ψ〉, and outputs C(x). By quantum no-cloning, an attacker cannot
output two copies of (|ψ〉 , C), which means that this scheme is already secure against duplicators.
Recall that we focused on designing SSL for duplicators in the hope that it will be later helpful
for designing SSL for arbitrary pirates. But any SSL scheme in which Run ignores the quantum
part would not be useful for obtaining SSL secure against arbitrary pirates; an attacker can sim-
ply replace the quantum state as part of the leased state with its own quantum state and copy the
classical part. To overcome this insufficiency, we need to design SSL schemes where the Run al-
gorithm only computes correctly when the input leased state belongs to a sparse set of quantum
states. This suggests that the Run algorithm implicitly satisfies a verifiability property; it should
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be able to verify that the input quantum state lies in this sparse set.
Publicly Verifiable Unclonable States. We wish to construct a family of efficiently preparable states
{|ψs〉}s with the following verifiability property. For any state |ψs〉 in the family, there is a way to
sample a classical description ds for |ψs〉 in such away that it can be verified that ds is a correspond-
ing description of |ψs〉. To be more precise, there should be a verification algorithm Ver(|ψs〉 , d)
that accepts if d is a valid description for |ψs〉. Furthermore, we want the guarantee that given a
valid pair (|ψs〉 , ds), no QPT adversary can produce |ψs〉⊗2.
Our requirement has the same flavor as public-key quantummoney, but a key difference is that
we are not requiring any secret or public keys, as well as the fact that anyone should be able to
generate such tuples (|ψs〉 , ds), not only a minting authority (bank).
Given such verifiable family, we can define the Run algorithm as follows,
Run(C, (|ψs〉 , d), x):
• If Ver(|ψs〉 , d)  0, output ⊥.
• Otherwise, output C(x).
Any lessor can now lease a state (|ψs〉 , ds , C), which would allow anyone to compute C using Run.
Of course, any pirate that is given (|ψs〉 , ds , C) can prepare their own (|ψs′〉 , ds′) and then input
(|ψs′〉 , ds′ , C) into Run. But recall that we are interested in ruling out duplicators. If the verifiable
tuples (|ψs〉 , ds) have the desired security guarantee, no such pirate could prepare |ψs〉⊗2 from
(|ψs〉 , ds), then no pirate can duplicate the leased state.
Verifiable Unclonable States from Subspace Hiding Obfuscation. Zhandry [56], in the context of con-
structing publicly-verifiable quantum money, shows how to achieve the notion we are looking for
from subspace hiding obfuscation, a notion he introduced and constructed from quantum-secure
indistinguishability obfuscation [15, 33] (qiO). Roughly speaking, a subspace hiding obfuscator
(shO) takes as input a description of a linear subspace A, and outputs a circuit that computes the
membership function for A, i.e. shO(A)(x)  1 iff x ∈ A. Zhandry shows that for a uniformly
random λ2 -dimensional subspace A ⊂ Zλq , given |A〉 : 1√
qλ/2
∑
a∈A
|a〉 along with g˜ ← shO(A), g˜⊥ ←
shO(A⊥), no QPT algorithm can prepare |A〉⊗2 with non-negligible probability. Nevertheless, be-
cause g˜ and g˜⊥ computemembership for A and A⊥ respectively, it is possible to project onto |A〉〈A |
using ( g˜ , g˜⊥). This lets anyone check the tuple (|ψ〉 , ( g˜, g˜⊥)) by measuring |ψ〉 with the projectors
{|A〉〈A | , I − |A〉〈A |}.
Main Template: SSL against Pirates. Our goal is to construct SSL against arbitrary QPT pirates
and not just duplicators or maulers. To achieve this goal, we combine the techniques we have
developed so far.
To lease a circuit C, do the following:
1. First prepare the state the state |A〉  1√
qλ/2
∑
a∈A
|a〉, alongwith g˜ ← shO(A)and g˜⊥ ← shO(A⊥).
2. Compute an input-hiding obfuscation of C, namely C˜.
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3. Let x  S(C); that is, x is an accepting point of C.
4. Compute a seNIZK proof π that (1) the obfuscations
(
g˜, g˜⊥, C˜
)
were computed correctly (as
they should have been) from (A, A⊥, C), and, (2) C(x)  1
5. Output |ψC〉 
(
|A〉 , g˜, g˜⊥, C˜, π
)
.
The Run algorithm on input (σ, g˜, g˜⊥, C˜, π) and x, first checks the proof π, and outputs⊥ if it does
not accept the proof. If it accepts the proof, it knows that g˜ and g˜⊥ are subspace obfuscators for
some subspaces A and A⊥ respectively; it can use them to measure |A〉〈A | on σ. This way it checks
whether σ is |A〉 or not. If it is not, then it outputs⊥. If it has not output⊥ so far, then it computes
C˜ on x to obtain C(x).
Intuitively, the above constructionwould satisfy lessor security because a pirate cannot generate
|A〉⊗2, so if it wants to have two valid copies to evaluate Run succesfully, it is forced to come upwith
a newquantum state |B〉. But if it does this, then it also has to change the classical part – specifically,
the subspace obfuscated circuits. Otherwise, the Run algorithm will detect that |A〉 was not given,
and output⊥. However, if the new copyhas a different subspace obfuscators, the piratewould have
to produce a proof a valid seNIZK proof for a different instance. This is something that the pirate
cannot do, because then we could extract an accepting input to C˜ which violates the simulation-
extractability security of seNIZK.
To prove the lessor security of the above scheme, we consider two cases depending on the
behavior of the pirate: (since the pirate has to return the original copy, we only focus on the copy
he keeps after returning back the original copy)
• Duplicator: in this case, the pirate produces a new copy that is of the form
(
σ∗, g˜, g˜⊥, C˜, π
)
;
that is, it has the same classical part as before. Now, we argue that either σ∗ is close to |A〉〈A |,
inwhich case it violates the no-cloning theoremor σ∗ is far from |A〉〈A | inwhich case, the new
copy is not going to be functionally equivalent to C. TheRun algorithmwill detect (σ∗ , g˜, g˜⊥),
and it will output ⊥.
• Mauler: If the pirate produces a new copy that is of the form
(
σ∗ , g˜∗, g˜⊥
∗
, C˜∗, π∗
)
such that(
g˜∗, g˜⊥
∗
, C˜∗
)
,
(
g˜, g˜⊥, C˜
)
, we can invoke the simulation-extractability property to find an
input x such that C˜∗(x)  1. Since C˜∗ is assumed to have the same functionality as C, this
means that C(x)  1. This would contradict the security of input-hiding obfuscation, since
any QPT adversary even given C˜ should not be able to find an accepting input x such that
C(x)  1.
1.3 Related Work
SSL is an addition to the rapidly growing list of quantum cryptographic primitives with the de-
sirable property of unclonability, and hence impossible to achieve classically. Besides the afore-
mentioned connections to software copy-protection, our work on SSL is related to the following
previous works.
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Quantum Money and Quantum Lightning. Using quantum mechanics to achieve unforgeabil-
ity has a history that predates quantum computing itself. Wiesner [55] informally introduced the
notion of unforgeable quantum money – unclonable quantum states that can also be (either pub-
licly or privately) verified to be valid states. A few constructions [3, 41, 34, 31, 6] achieved quantum
money with various features and very recently, in a breakthrough work, Zhandry [56] shows how
to construct publicly-verifiable quantum money from cryptographic assumptions. Zhandry also
introduced a stronger notion of quantum money, which he coined quantum lightning, and con-
structed it from cryptographic assumptions.
CertifiableDeletion andUnclonableEncryption. Unclonability has also been studied in the con-
text of encryption schemes. The work of [36] studies the problem of quantum tamper detection.
Alice can use a quantum state to send Bob an encryption of a classical message m with the guaran-
tee that any eavsdropper could not have cloned the ciphertext. After Bob receives the ciphertext,
he can check if the state has been tampered with, and if this is not the case, he would know that a
potential eavsdropper did not keep a copy of the ciphertext. In recent work, Broadbent and Lord
[26] introduced the notion of unclonable encryption. Roughly speaking, an unclonable encryp-
tion allows Alice to give Bob and Charlie an encryption of a classical message m, in the form of a
quantum state σ(m), such that Bob and Charlie cannot ‘split’ the state among them.
In a follow-up work, Broadbent and Islam [24], construct a one-time use encryption scheme
with certifiable deletion. An encryption scheme has certifiable deletion, if there is an algorithm to
check that a ciphertext was deleted. The security guarantee is that if an adversary is in possession
of the ciphertext, and it then passes the certification of deletion, the issuer of the encryption can
now give the secret key to the adversary. At this point, the adversary still can’t distinguish which
plaintext correspond to the ciphertext it was given.
QuantumObfuscation. Our proof of the impossibility of SSL is inspired by the proof of Barak et
al. [13] on the impossibility of VBB for arbitrary functions. Alagic and Fefferman[9] formalized the
notion of program obfuscation via quantum tools, defining quantum virtual black-box obfuscation
(qVBB) and quantum indistinguishability obfuscation (qiO), as the natural quantum analogues to
the respective classical notions (VBB and iO). They also proved quantum analogues of some of the
previous impossibility results from [13], as well as provided quantum cryptographic applications
from qVBB and qiO.
QuantumOne-TimePrograms andOne-TimeTokens. One natural question to ask is if quantum
mechanics alone allows the existence of ‘one-time’ use cryptographic primivites. Quantum One-
Time programs, that use only quantum information, are not possible even under computational
assumptions [23]. This rules out the possibility of having a copy-protection scheme where a single
copy of the software is consumed by the evaluation procedure. Despite the lack of quantum one-
time programs, there are constructions of secure ‘one-time’ signature tokens in the oracle models
[16] [11]. A quantum token for signatures is a quantum state that would let anyone in possession
of it to sign an arbitrary document, but only once. The token is destroyed in the signing process.
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Quantum Tomography. Quantum tomography is the task of learning a description of a mixed
state ρ given multiple copies of it [39] [46]. One possible way to break SSL (or copy-protection)
would be to learn a valid description of the state ρC directly from having access to multiple copies
of the leased program, ρ⊗k
C
. Indeed, in recent work in this area, Aaronson [5] showed that in order
for copy-protection to be possible at all it must be based on computational assumptions.
Recent Work on Copy-Protection. While finishing this manuscript, we became aware of very
recent work on copy-protection. Aaronson et al. [8] constructed copy-protection for unlearnable
functions relative to a classical oracle. Our work complements their results, since we show that
obtaining copy-protection in the standard model (i.e., without oracles) is not possible.
Acknowledgements. We thankAlexDalzell for helpful discussions, andAramHarrow for useful
feedback. During this work, RL was funded by NSF grant CCF-1729369. MIT-CTP/5204
2 Preliminaries
We assume that the reader is familiar with basic cryptographic notions such as negligible functions
and computational indistinguishability (see [35]).
The security parameter is denoted by λ and we denote negl(λ) to be a negligible function in λ.
We denote (classical) computational indistiguishability of two distributionsD0 andD1 byD0 ≈c,ε
D1. In the case when ε is negligible, we drop ε from this notation.
2.1 Quantum
For completeness, we present some of the basic quantum definitions, for more details see [45].
Quantum states and channels. LetH be any finite Hilbert space, and let L(H) : {E : H →H}
be the set of all linear operators fromH to itself (or endomorphism). Quantum states overH are
the positive semidefinite operators in L(H) that have unit trace, we call these density matrices, and
use the notation ρ or σ to stand for densitymatriceswhen possible. Quantum channels or quantum
operations acting on quantum states overH are completely positive trace preserving (CPTP) linear
maps from L(H) to L(H ′)whereH ′ is any other finite dimensional Hilbert space. We use the trace
distance, denoted by
ρ − σ
tr
, as our distance measure on quantum states,
ρ − σ
tr

1
2
Tr
[√(
ρ − σ)† (ρ − σ)]
A state over H  C2 is called a qubit. For any n ∈ N, we refer to the quantum states over
H  (C2)⊗n as n-qubit quantum states. To perform a standard basis measurement on a qubit
means projecting the qubit into {|0〉 , |1〉}. A quantum register is a collection of qubits. A classical
register is a quantum register that is only able to store qubits in the computational basis.
A unitary quantum circuit is a sequence of unitary operations (unitary gates) acting on a fixed
number of qubits. Measurements in the standard basis can be performed at the end of the unitary
circuit. A (general) quantum circuit is a unitary quantum circuit with 2 additional operations: (1) a
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gate that adds an ancilla qubit to the system, and (2) a gate that discards (trace-out) a qubit from the
system. A quantum polynomial-time algorithm (QPT) is a uniform collection of quantum circuits
{Cn}n∈N. We always assume that theQPT adversaries are non-uniform– aQPT adversaryA acting
on n qubits could be given a quantum auxiliary state with poly(n) qubits.
Quantum Computational Indistinguishability. When we talk about quantum distinguishers,
we need the following definitions, which we take from [53].
Definition 6 (Indistinguishable collections of states). Let I be an infinite subset I ⊂ {0, 1}∗, let p : N→
N be a polynomially bounded function, and let ρx and σx be p(|x |)-qubit states. We say that {ρx}x∈I and
{σx}x∈I are quantum computationally indistinguishable collections of quantum states if for every
QPT E that outputs a single bit, any polynomially bounded q : N → N, and any auxiliary q(|x |)-qubits
state ν, and for all x ∈ I, we have thatPr [E(ρx ⊗ ν)  1] − Pr [E(σx ⊗ ν)  1] ≤ ǫ(|x |)
for some function ǫ : N→ [0, 1]. We use the following notation
ρx ≈Q ,ǫ σx
and we ignore the ǫ when it is understood that it is a negligible function.
Definition 7 (Indistinguishability of channels). Let I be an infinite subset I ⊂ {0, 1}∗, let p , q : N→ N
be polynomially bounded functions, and let Dx , Fx be quantum channels mapping p(|x |)-qubit states to
q(|x |)-qubit states. We say that {Dx}x∈I and {Fx}x∈I are quantum computationally indistinguishable
collection of channels if for every QPT E that outputs a single bit, any polynomially bounded t : N→ N,
any p(|x |) + t(|x |)-qubit quantum state ρ, and for all x ∈ I, we have thatPr [E ((Dx ⊗ Id)(ρ))  1] − Pr [E ((Fx ⊗ Id)(ρ))  1]  ≤ ǫ(|x |)
for some function ǫ : N→ [0, 1]. We will use the following notation
Dx(·) ≈Q ,ǫ Fx(·)
and we ignore the ǫ when it is understood that it is a negligible function.
QuantumFourier Transform andSubspaces. Ourmain constructionuses the same typeof quan-
tum states (superpositions over linear subspaces) considered by [7, 56] in the context of construct-
ing quantum money.
We recall some key facts from these works relevant to our construction. Consider the field Zλq
where q ≥ 2,and let FT denote the quantum fourier transfrom over Zλq .
For any linear subspace A, let A⊥ denote its orthogonal (dual) subspace,
A⊥  {v ∈ Zλq |〈v , a〉  0}.
Let |A〉  1√
|A|
∑
a∈A
|a〉. The quantum fourier Transform, FT, does the following:
FT|A〉  |A⊥〉.
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Since (A⊥)⊥  A, we also have FT |A⊥〉  |A〉.
Let ΠA 
∑
a∈A
|a〉〈a |, then as shown in Lemma 21 of [7],
FT(ΠA⊥)FTΠA  |A〉〈A |.
Almost As Good As New Lemma. We use the Almost As Good As New Lemma [2], restated
here verbatim from [4].
Lemma 8 (Almost As Good As New). Let ρ be a mixed state acting on Cd . Let U be a unitary and
(Π0 ,Π1  1−Π0) be projectors all acting onCd⊗Cd. We interpret (U,Π0 ,Π1) as ameasurement performed
by appending an acillary system of dimension d′ in the state |0〉〈0|, applying U and then performing the
projective measurement {Π0 ,Π1} on the larger system. Assuming that the outcome corresponding toΠ0 has
probability 1 − ε, i.e., Tr[Π0(Uρ ⊗ |0〉〈0|U†)]  1 − ε, we haveρ − ρ˜
tr
≤ √ε,
where ρ˜ is state after performing the measurement and then undoing the unitary U and tracing out the
ancillary system:
ρ˜  Trd′
(
U†
(
Π0U
(
ρ ⊗ |0〉〈0|) U†Π0 +Π1U (ρ ⊗ |0〉〈0|) U†Π1) U)
We use this Lemma to argue that whenever a QPT algorithmA on input ρ, outputs a particular
bit string z with probability 1 − ε, then A can be performed in a way that also lets us recover the
initial state. In particular, given the QPT description forA, we can implementA with an acillary
system, aunitary, and onlymeasuring in the computational basis after the unitary has been applied,
similarly to Lemma 8. Then, it is possible to uncompute in order to also obtain ρ˜.
Notation about Quantum-Secure Classical Primitives. For a classical primitive X, we use the
notation q-X to denote the fact that we assume X to be secure against QPT adversaries.
2.2 Learning with Errors
We consider the decisional learning with errors (LWE) problem, introduced by Regev [51]. We
define this problem formally below.
The problem (n , m , q , χ)-LWE, where n , m , q ∈ N and χ is a distribution supported
over Z, is to distinguish between the distributions (A,As + e) and (A, u), where A $←−
Zm×nq , s
$←− Zn×1q , e
$←− χm×1 and u← Zm×1q .
The above problem has been believed to be hard against classical PPT algorithms – also referred
to as LWE assumption – has had many powerful applications in cryptography. In this work, we
conjecture the above problem to be hard even against QPT algorithms; this conjecture referred to as
QLWE assumption has been useful in the constructions of interesting primitives such as quantum
fully-homomorphic encryption [42, 20]. We refer to this assumption as QLWE assumption.
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QLWE assumption: This assumption is parameterized by λ. Let n  poly(λ), m 
poly(n · log(q)) and χ be a discrete Gaussian distribution6 with parameter αq > 0,
where α can set to be any non-negative number.
Any QPT distinguisher (even given access to polynomial-sized advice state) can solve
(n , m , q , χ)-LWE only with probability negl(λ), for some negligible function negl.
Remark 9. We drop the notation λ from the description of the assumption when it is clear.
(n , m , q , χ)-LWE is shown [51, 47] to be as hard as approximating shortest independent vector
problem (SIVP) to within a factor of γ  O˜(n/α) (where α is defined above). The best known
quantum algorithms for this problem run in time 2O˜(n/log(γ)).
For our construction of SSL, we require a stronger version of QLWE that is secure even against
sub-exponential quantum adversaries. We state this assumption formally below.
T-Sub-exponential QLWE Assumption: This assumption is parameterized by λ and
timeT. Let n  T+poly(λ), m  poly(n·log(q))and χ be adiscreteGaussiandistribution
with parameter αq > 0, where α can set to be any non-negative number.
Any quantum distinguisher (even given access to polynomial-sized advice state) run-
ning in time 2O˜(T) can solve (n , m , q , χ)-LWE only with probability negl(λ), for some
negligible function negl.
2.3 Quantum Fully Homomorphic Encryption
A fully homomorphic encryption scheme allows for publicly evaluating an encryption of x using a
function f to obtain an encryption of f (x). Traditionally f has beenmodeled as classical circuits but
in thiswork,we consider the settingwhen f ismodeled as quantumcircuits andwhen themessages
are quantum states. This notion is referred to as quantum fully homomorphic encryption (QFHE).
We state our definition verbatim from [25].
Definition 10. LetM be the Hilbert space associated with the message space (plaintexts), C be the Hilbert
space associated with the ciphertexts, and Revk be the Hilbert space associated with the evaluation key. A
quantum fully homomorphic encryption scheme is a tuple of QPT algorithms QFHE  (Gen, Enc,Dec,
Eval) satisfying
• QFHE.Gen(1λ): outputs a a public and a secret key, (pk, sk), as well as a quantum state ρevk , which
can serve as an evaluation key.
• QFHE.Enc(pk, ·) : L(M) → L(C): takes as input a state ρ and outputs a ciphertext σ
• QFHE.Dec(sk, ·) : L(C) → L(M): takes a quantum ciphertext σ, and outputs a qubit ρ in the
message space L(M).
• QFHE.Eval(E , ·) : L(Revk ⊗ C⊗n) → L(C⊗m): takes as input a quantum circuit E : L(M⊗n) →
L(M⊗m), and a ciphertext in L(C⊗n) and outputs a ciphertext in L(C⊗m), possibly consuming the
evaluation key ρevk in the proccess.
6Refer [20] for a definition of discrete Gaussian distribution.
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Semantic security and compactness are defined analogously to the classical setting, and we defer
to [25] for a definition. For the impossibility result, we require a QFHE scheme where ciphertexts
of classical plaintexts are also classical. Given any x ∈ {0, 1}, we want QFHE.Encpk(|x〉〈x |) to be
a computational basis state |z〉〈z | for some z ∈ {0, 1}l (here, l is the length of ciphertexts for 1-bit
messages). In this case, we write QFHE.Encpk(x). We also want the same to be true for evaluated
ciphertexts, i.e. if E(|x〉〈x |)  |y〉〈y | for some x ∈ {0, 1}n and y ∈ {0, 1}m , then
QFHE.Encpk(y) ← QFHE.Eval(ρevk , E ,QFHE.Encpk(x))
is a classical ciphertext of y.
Instantiation. The works of [42, 20] give lattice-based candidates for quantum fully homomor-
phic encryption schemes; we currentlydo not knowhow to base this on learningwith errors alone7.
The desirable property required from the quantumFHE schemes, that classical messages have clas-
sical ciphertexts, is satisfied by both candidates [42, 20].
2.4 Circuit Class of Interest: Evasive Circuits
The circuit class we consider in our construction of SSL is a subclass of evasive circuits. We recall
the definition of evasive circuits below.
Evasive Circuits. Informally, a class of circuits is said to be evasive if a circuit drawn from a
suitable distribution outputs 1 on a fixed point with negligible probability.
Definition 11 (Evasive Circuits). A class of circuits C  {Cλ}λ∈N, associated with a distribution DC, is
said to be evasive if the following holds: for every λ ∈ N, every x ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ),
Pr
C←DC
[C(x)  1] ≤ negl(λ),
Compute-and-compareCircuits. The subclass of circuits thatwe are interested in is called compute-
and-compare circuits, denoted by Ccnc. A compute-and-compare circuit is of the following form:
C[C, α], where α is called a lock and C has output length |α |, is defined as follows:
C[C, α](x) 
{
1, if C(x)α,
0, otherwise
Multi-bit compute-and-compare circuits. We can correspondingly define the notion of multi-bit
compute-and-compare circuits. Amulti-bit compute-and-compare circuit is of the following form:
C[C, α,msg](x) 
{
msg, if C(x)α,
0, otherwise
,
where msg is a binary string.
We consider two types of distributions as defined by [54].
7Brakerski [20] remarks that the security of their candidate can be based on a circular security assumption that is also
used to argue the security of existing constructions of unbounded depth multi-key FHE [27, 44, 48, 21].
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Definition 12 (Distributions for Compute-and-Compare Circuits). We consider the following distri-
butions on Ccnc:
• Dunpred(λ): For any (C[C, α]) along with aux sampled from this unpredictable distribution, it holds
that α is computationally unpredictable given (C, aux).
• Dpseud(λ): For anyC[C, α] alongwithauxsampled from this distribution, it holds thatHHILL (α |(C, aux)) ≥
λε, for some constant ǫ > 0, whereHHILL(·) is the HILL entropy [40].
Note that with respect to the above distributions, the compute-and-compare class of circuits Ccnc
is evasive.
Searchability. For our construction of SSL for C, we crucially use the fact that given a circuit
C ∈ C, we can read off an input x from the description of C such that C(x)  1. We formalize this
by defining a search algorithm S that on input a circuit C outputs an accepting input for C. For
many interesting class of functions, there do exist a corresponding efficiently implementable class
of circuits associated with a search algorithm S.
Definition 13 (Searchability). A class of circuits C  {Cλ}λ∈N is said to be S-searchable, with respect
to a PPT algorithm S, if the following holds: on input C, S(C) outputs x such that C(x)  1.
SearchableCompute-and-CompareCircuits: Examples. Asmentioned in the introduction, there
are natural and interesting classes of searchable compute-and-compare circuits. For completeness,
we state them again below with additional examples [54].
• Point circuits C(α, ·): the circuit C(α, ·) is a point circuit if it takes as input x and outputs
C(α, x)  1 iff x  α. If we define the class of point circuits suitably, we can find α directly
from Cα; for instance, α can be the value assigned to the input wires of C.
• Conjunctions with wild cards C(S, α, ·): the circuit C(S, α, ·) is a conjunction with wild cards
if it takes as input x and outputs C(S, α, x)  1 iff y  α, where y is such that yi  xi for all
i ∈ S. Again, if we define this class of circuits suitably, we can find S and α directly from the
description of C(S, α, ·). Once we find S and α, we can find the accepting input.
• AffineTester: the circuit C(A, α, ·) is an affine tester,withA, ywhereAhas a non-trivial kernel
space, if it takes as input x and outputs C(A, α, x)  1 iff A · x  α. By reading off A and α
and using Gaussian elimination we can find x such that A · x  α.
• Plaintext equality checker C(sk, α, ·): the circuit C(sk, α, ·), with hardwired values decryption
key sk associated with a private key encryption scheme, message α, is a plaintext equality
checker if it takes as input a ciphertext ct and outputs C(sk, α, ct)  1 iff the decryption of ct
with respect to sk is α. By reading off α and sk, we can find a ciphertext such that ct is an
encryption of α.
Remark 14. We note that both the candidate constructions of copy-protection for point functions by Aaron-
son [3] use the fact that the accepting point of the point function is known by whoever is generating the
copy-protected circuit.
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2.5 Obfuscation
In this work, we use different notions of cryptographic obfucation. We review all the required
notions below, but first we recall the functionality of obfuscation.
Definition 15 (Functionality of Obfuscation). Consider a class of circuits C. An obfuscator O consists
of two PPT algorithms Obf and Eval such that the following holds: for every λ ∈ N, circuit C ∈ C,
x ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ), we have C(x) ← Eval(C˜, x) where C˜ ← Obf(1λ , C).
2.5.1 Lockable Obfuscation
In the impossibility result, wewillmake use of programobfuscation schemes that are (i) defined for
compute-and-compare circuits and, (ii) satisfy distributional virtual black box security notion [15].
Such obfuscation schemes were first introduced by [54, 38] and are called lockable obfuscation
schemes. We recall their definition, adapted to quantum security, below.
Definition 16 (Quantum-Secure Lockable Obfuscation). An obfuscation scheme (LO.Obf, LO.Eval) for
a class of circuits C is said to be a quantum-secure lockable obfuscation scheme if the following properties
are satisfied:
• It satisfies the functionality of obfuscation.
• Compute-and-compare circuits: Each circuitC inC is parameterized by strings α ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ) , β ∈
{0, 1}poly(λ) and a poly-sized circuit C such that on every input x, C(x) outputs β if and only if
C(x)  α.
• Security: For every polynomial-sized circuit C, string β ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ),for every QPT adversary A
there exists a QPT simulator Sim such that the following holds: sample α
$←− {0, 1}poly(λ),{
LO.Obf
(
1λ ,C
)}
≈Q ,ε
{
Sim
(
1λ , 1|C |
)}
,
where C is a circuit parameterized by C, α, β with ε ≤ 1
2|α | .
Instantiation. Theworks of [54, 38, 37] construct a lockable obfuscation schemebasedonpolynomial-
security of learning with errors (see Section 2.2). Since learning with errors is conjectured to be
hard against QPT algorithms, the obfuscation schemes of [54, 38, 37] are also secure against QPT
algorithms. Thus, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 17 ([38, 54, 37]). Assuming quantum hardness of learning with errors, there exists a quantum-
secure lockable obfuscation scheme.
2.5.2 q-Input-Hiding Obfuscators
One of the main tools used in our construction is q-input-hiding obfuscators. The notion of input-
hiding obfuscators was first defined in the classical setting by Barak et al. [14]. We adopt the same
notion except that we require the security of the primitive to hold against QPT adversaries.
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The notion of q-input-hiding obfuscators states that given an obfuscated circuit, it should be
infeasible for a QPT adversary to find an accepting input; that is, an input on which the circuit
outputs 1. Note that this notion is only meaningful for the class of evasive circuits.
The definition below is suitably adapted from Barak et al. [14]; in particular, our security should
hold against QPT adversaries.
Definition 18 (q-Input-HidingObfuscators [14]). AnobfuscatorqIHO  (Obf, Eval) for a class of circuits
associated with distribution DC is q-input-hiding if for every non-uniform QPT adversary A, for every
sufficiently large λ ∈ N,
Pr
C(x)  1 :
C←DC (λ),
C˜←Obf(1λ ,C),
x←A(1λ ,C˜)
 ≤ negl(λ).
2.5.3 Subspace Hiding Obfuscators
Another ingredient in our construction is subspace hiding obfuscation. Subspace hiding obfusca-
tion is a notion of obfuscation introduced by Zhandry [56], as a tool to build pulic-key quantum
money schemes. This notion allows for obfuscating a circuit, associated with subspace A, that
checks if an input vector belongs to this subspace A or not. In terms of security, we require that
the obfuscation of this circuit is indistinguishable from obfuscation of another circuit that tests
membership of a larger random (and hidden) subspace containing A.
Definition 19 ([56]). Asubspace hiding obfuscator for a field F anddimensions d0 , d1, λ is a tuple (shO.Obf, shO.Eval)
satisfying:
• shO.Obf(A): on input an efficient description of a linear subspace A ⊂ Fλ of dimensions d ∈ {d0 , d1}
outputs an obfuscator shO(A).
• Correctness: For any A of dimension d ∈ {d0 , d1}, it holds that
Pr[∀x , shO.Eval(shO.Obf(A), x)  1A(x) : shO(A) ← shO.Obf(A)] ≥ 1 − negl(λ),
where: 1A(x)  1 if x ∈ A and 0, otherwise.
• Quantum-Security: AnyQPT adversaryA canwin the following challenge with probability at most
negligibly greater than 12 .
1. A chooses a d0-dimensional subspace A ⊂ Fλ .
2. Challenger chooses uniformly at random a d1-dimensional subspace S ⊇ A. It samples a random
bit b. If b  0, it sends g˜0 ← shO.Obf(A). Otherwise, it sends g˜1 ← shO.Obf(S)
3. A receives g˜b and outputs b′. It wins if b′  b.
Instantiation. Zhandry presented a construction of subspace obfuscators from indistinguishabil-
ity obfuscation [15, 33] secure against QPT adversaries.
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2.6 q-Simulation-Extractable Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge
Wealso use the tool of non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) systems forNP for our construction.
A NIZK is defined between a classical PPT prover P and a verifier V. The goal of the prover is
to convince the verifier V to accept an instance x using a witness w while at the same time, not
revealing any information about w. Moreover, any malicious prover should not be able to falsely
convince the verifier to accept a NO instance. Since we allow the malicious parties to be QPT, we
term this NIZK as qNIZK.
We require the qNIZKs to satisfy a stronger property called simulation extractability and we
call a qNIZK satisfying this stronger property to be q-simulation-extractable NIZK (qseNIZK).
We describe the PPT algorithms of qseNIZK below.
• CRSGen(1λ): On input security parameter λ, it outputs the common reference string crs.
• P(crs, x , w): On input common reference string crs, NP instance x, witness w, it outputs the
proof π.
• V(crs, x , π): On input common reference string crs, instance x, proof π, it outputs accept or
reject. This is a deterministic algorithm.
This notion is associated with the following properties. We start with the standard notion of com-
pleteness.
Definition 20 (Completeness). A non-interactive protocol qseNIZK for a NP language L is said to be
complete if the following holds: for every (x , w) ∈ R(L), we have the following:
Pr
[
V(crs, x , π) accepts : crs←CRSGen(1
λ)
π←P(crs,x,w)
]
 1
q-Simulation-Extractability. We now describe the simulation-extractability property. Suppose
there exists an adversarywhoupon receivingmanyproofsπ1, . . . , πq onallYES instances x1, . . . , xq,
can produce a proof π′ on instance x′ such that: (a) x′ is different from all the instances x1, . . . , xq
and, (b) π′ is accepting with probability ε. Then, this notion guarantees the existence of two ef-
ficient algorithms Sim1 and Sim2 such that all the proofs π1 , . . . , πq , are now simulated by Sim1,
and Sim2 can extract a valid witness for x
′ from (x′, π′) produced by the adversary with probability
negligibly close to ε.
Definition 21 (q-Simulation-Extractability). Anon-interactive protocol qseNIZK for a language L is said
to satisfy q-simulation-extractability if there exists a non-uniform QPT adversary A  (A1 ,A2) such
that the following holds:
Pr

V(crs,x′ ,π′) accepts∧
(∀i∈[q],(xi ,wi)∈R(L))∧
(∀i∈[q], x′,xi)
:
crs←CRSGen(1λ),
({(xi ,wi )}i∈[q],stA)←A1(crs)
∀i∈[q], πi←P(crs,td,xi)
(x′ ,π′)←A2(stA ,π1 ,...,πq)

 ε
21
Then there exists QPT algorithms FkGen and Sim  (Sim1, Sim2) such that the following holds:
Pr

V(crs,x′ ,π′) accepts∧
(∀i∈[q],(xi ,wi)∈R(L))∧
(x′,w′)∈R(L)∧
(∀i∈[q], x′,xi)
:
(crs,td)←FkGen(1λ),
({(xi ,wi)}i∈[q],stA)←A1(crs)
(π1 ,...,πq ,stSim)←Sim1(crs,td,{xi}i∈[q])
(x′ ,π′)←A2(stA ,π1 ,...,πq)
w′←Sim2(stSim ,x′ ,π′)

− ε

≤ negl(λ)
We call a non-interactive argument system satisfying q-simulation-extractability property to be a qseNIZK
system.
If q-smulation-extractability property holds against quantum adversaries running in time 2O˜(T) (O˜(·)
notation suppresses additive factors in O(log(λ))) then we say that (CRSGen,P ,V) is a T-sub-exponential
qseNIZK system.
Remark22. The definition as stated above isweaker compared to other definitions of simulation-extractability
considered in the literature. For instance, we can consider general adversaries who also can obtain simulated
proofs for false statements which is disallowed in the above setting. Nonetheless, the definition considered
above is sufficient for our application.
Instantiation ofqseNIZKs. In the classical setting, simulation-extractableNIZKs can be obtained
by generically [52, 30] combining a traditionalNIZK (satisfying completeness, soundness and zero-
knowledge) with a public-key encryption scheme satisfying CCA2 security. We observe that the
same transformation can be ported to the quantum setting as well, by suitably instantiating the
underlying primitives to be quantum-secure. These primitives in turn can be instantiated from
QLWE. Thus, we can obtain a q-simulation-extractable NIZK from QLWE.
For our construction of SSL, it turns out thatwe need a q-simulation-extractable NIZK that is se-
cure against quantum adversaries running in sub-exponential time. Fortunately, we can still adapt
the same transformationbut instead instantiating theunderlyingprimitives to be sub-exponentially
secure.
Before we formalize this theorem, we first state the necessary preliminary background.
Definition 23 (q-Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge). A non-interactive system (CRSGen,P ,V) de-
fined for a NP language L is said to be q-non-interactive zero-knowledge (qNIZK) if it satisfies Defi-
nition 20 and additionally, satisfies the following properties:
• Adaptive Soundness: For any malicious QPT prover P∗, the following holds:
Pr
[V(crs,x,π) accepts∧
x′<L
:
crs←CRSGen(1λ)
(x,π)←P∗(crs)
]
≤ negl(λ)
• Adaptive (Multi-Theorem)Zero-knowledge: For anyQPTverifierV ∗, there exists twoQPTalgorithms
FkGen and simulator Sim, such that the following holds:Pr
[
1←V∗(st,{π}i∈[q])∧
∀i∈[q], (xi ,wi)∈R(L)
:
crs←CRSGen(1λ)
({(xi ,wi)}i∈[q],st)←V∗(crs)
∀i∈[q], πi←P(crs,xi ,wi)
]
− Pr

1←V∗(st,{π}i∈[q])∧
∀i∈[q], (xi ,wi)∈R(L)
:
(crs,td)←FkGen(1λ)
({(xi ,wi)}i∈[q],st)←V∗(crs)
{πi}i∈[q]←Sim(crs,td,{xi}i∈[q])

 ≤ negl(λ)
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If both adaptive soundness and adaptive multi-theorem zero-knowledge holds against quantum adversaries
running in time 2O˜(T) then we say that (CRSGen,P ,V) is a T-sub-exponential qNIZK.
Remark 24. q-simulation-extractable NIZKs imply qNIZKs since simulation-extractability implies both
soundness and zero-knowledge properties.
Definition 25 (q-CCA2-secure PKE). A public-encryption scheme (Setup, Enc,Dec) (defined below) is
said to satify q-CCA2-security if every QPT adversary A wins in ExptA (defined below) only with negli-
gible probability.
• Setup(1λ): On input security parameter λ, output a public key pk and a decryption key sk.
• Enc(pk, x): On input public-key pk, message x, output a ciphertext ct.
• Dec(sk, ct): On input decryption key sk, ciphertext ct, output y.
For any x ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ), we have Dec(sk, Enc(pk, x))  x.
ExptA(1λ , b):
• Challenger generates Setup(1λ) to obtain (pk, sk). It sends pk toA.
• A has (classical) access to a decryption oracle that on input ct, outputs Dec(sk, ct). It can make
polynomially many queries.
• A then submits (x0 , x1) to the challenger which then returns ct∗ ← Enc(pk, xb).
• A is then given access to the same oracle as before. The only restriction onA is that it cannot query
ct∗.
• Output b′ where the output ofA is b′.
A wins in ExptA with probability µ(λ) if Pr
[
b  b′ : b
$←−{0,1}
ExptA(1λ)
]

1
2 + µ(λ).
If the above q-CCA2 security holds against quantum adveraries running in time 2O˜(T) then we say that
(Setup, Enc,Dec) is a T-sub-exponential q-CCA2-secure PKE scheme.
Remark 26. One could also consider the setting when the CCA2 adversary has superposition access to the
oracle. However, for our construction, it suffices to consider the setting when the adversary only has classical
access to the oracle.
Consider the following lemma.
Lemma 27. Consider a language Lℓ ∈ NP such that every x ∈ Lℓ is such that |x |  ℓ.
Under the ℓ-sub-exponential QLWE assumption, there exists a q-simulation-extractable NIZKs for Lℓ
satisfying perfect completeness.
Proof. Wefirst state the followingproposition that showshow togenerically construct aq-simulation-
extractable NIZK from qNIZK and a CCA2-secure public-key encryption scheme.
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Proposition 28. Consider a language Lℓ ∈ NP such that every x ∈ Lℓ is such that |x |  ℓ.
Assuming ℓ-sub-exponential qNIZKs for NP and ℓ-sub-exponential q-CCA2-secure PKE schemes, there
exists a ℓ-sub-exponential qseNIZK system for Lℓ .
Proof. Let qPKEbe a ℓ-sub-exponential qCCA2-securePKE scheme. Let qNIZKbe a ℓ-sub-exponential
qNIZK for the following relation.
RqNIZK 
{
((pk, ctw , x), (w , rw)) :
(
(x , w) ∈ R(Lℓ)
∧
ctw  Enc(pk, (x , w); rw)
)}
We present the construction (quantum analogue of [52, 30]) of q-simulation-extractable NIZK for
Lℓ below.
• CRSGen(1λ): On input security parameter λ,
– Compute qNIZK.CRSGen(1λ1 ) to obtain qNIZK.crs, where λ1  poly(λ, ℓ) is chosen such
that qNIZK is a ℓ-sub-exponential q-non-interactive zero-knowledge argument system.
– Compute qPKE.Setup(1λ2 ) to obtain (pk, sk), where λ2  poly(λ, ℓ) is chosen such that
qPKE is a ℓ-sub-exponential q-CCA2-secure PKE scheme.
Output crs  (pk, qNIZK.crs).
• P(crs, x , w): On input common reference string crs, instance x, witness w,
– Parse crs as (pk, qNIZK.crs).
– Compute ctw ← qPKE.Enc(pk, (x , w); rw), where rw $←− {0, 1}poly(λ).
– Compute qNIZK.π ← qNIZK.P(qNIZK.crs, (pk, ctw , x), (w , rw)).
Output π  (qNIZK.π, ctw).
• V(crs, x , π): On input common reference string crs, NP instance x, proof π,
– Parse crs as (pk, ct, qNIZK.crs).
– Output qNIZK.V (qNIZK.crs, (pk, ctw , x), π).
We prove that the above argument system satisfies q-simulation-extractability. We describe the
algorithms FkGen and Sim  (Sim1.Sim2) below. Let qNIZK.FkGen and qNIZK.Sim be the QPT al-
gorithms associated with the zero-knowledge property of qNIZK.
FkGen(1λ): Compute (qNIZK.crs, τ) ← qNIZK.FkGen (1λ) . Compute (pk, sk) ← qPKE.Setup(1λ).
Output crs  (qNIZK.crs, pk, ct) and td  (τ, sk).
Sim1
(
crs, td, {xi}i∈[q]
)
: Compute qNIZK.Sim (qNIZK.crs, τ, (pk, ct, xi)) to obtain qNIZK.πi , for every
i ∈ [q]. Output {qNIZK.π1 , . . . , qNIZK.πq} and st  (td, crs, ({xi}i∈[q])) .
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Sim2 (st, x′, π′): On input st 
(
td  (τ, sk), crs,
(
{xi}i∈[q]
))
, instance x′, proof π′  (qNIZK.π′, ct′w),
compute Dec(sk, ct′w′) to obtain w′. Output w′.
SupposeA be a quantum adversary running in time 2O˜(ℓ) such that the following holds:
Pr

V(crs,x′,π′) accepts∧
(∀i∈[q], (xi ,wi)∈R(L))∧
(∀i∈[q], x′,xi)
:
crs←CRSGen(1λ),
({(xi ,wi)}i∈[q],stA)←A1(crs)
∀i∈[q], πi←P(crs,td,xi )
(x′,π′)←A2(stA ,π1 ,...,πq)

 ε
Let δ be such that the following holds:
Pr

V(crs,x′ ,π′) accepts∧
(∀i∈[q],(xi ,wi )∈R(L))∧
(x′ ,w′)∈R(L)∧
(∀i∈[q], x′,xi)
:
(crs,td)←FkGen(1λ),
({(xi ,wi)}i∈[q],stA)←A1(crs)
(π1 ,...,πq ,stSim)←Sim1(crs,td,{xi}i∈[q])
(x′ ,π′)←A2(stA ,π1 ,...,πq)
w′←Sim2(stSim ,x′,π′)

 δ
We prove using a standard hybrid argument that |δ − ε | ≤ negl(λ).
Hybrid1: A is given π1 , . . . , πq , where πi ← P(crs, xi , wi). Let (x′, π′) is the output ofA and parse
π′  (qNIZK.π′, ct′w). Decrypt ct′w using sk to obtain (x∗ , w′).
From the adaptive soundness of qNIZK, the probability that (x′, w′) ∈ R(Lℓ) and x∗  x′ is
negligibly close to ε.
Hybrid2: A is given π1 , . . . , πq , where the proofs are generated as follows: first compute (qNIZK.π1 ,
. . . , qNIZK.πq) ← qNIZK.Sim(crs, td, {xi}i∈[q]), where (crs, td) ← qNIZK.FkGen(1λ). Then compute
ctwi ← Enc(pk, (xi , wi)) for every i ∈ [q]. Set πi  (qNIZK.πi , ctwi ). The rest of this hybrid is defined
as in Hybrid1.
From the adaptive zero-knowledge property of qNIZK, the probability that (x′, w′) ∈ R(Lℓ) and
x∗  x′ in the hybrid Hybrid2. j is still negligibly close to ε.
Hybrid3: This hybrid is defined similar to the previous hybrid except that ctwi ← Enc(pk, 0), for
every i ∈ [q].
From the previous hybrids, it follows that ct′w , ctwi , for all i ∈ [q] with probability negligibly
close to ε; this follows from the fact that qPKE is perfectly correct and the fact that x∗  x′ holds
with probability negligibly close to ε. Thus, we can invoke q-CCA2-security of qPKE, the proba-
bility that (x′, w′) ∈ R(Lℓ) is still negligibly close to ε.
But note that Hybrid3 corresponds to the simulated experiment and thus we just showed that the
probability that we can recover w′ such that (x′, w′) ∈ R(Lℓ) is negligibly close to ε.

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Theprimitives in the above proposition can be instantiated from sub-exponentialQLWEby starting
with existing LWE-based constructions of the above primitive and suitably setting the parameters
of the underlying LWE assumption. We state the following propositions without proof.
Proposition 29 ([49]). Assuming ℓ-sub-exponential QLWE (Section 2.2), there exists a ℓ-sub-exponential
qNIZK for NP.
Remark 30. To be precise, the work of [49] constructs a NIZK system satisfying adaptive multi-theorem
zero-knowledge and non-adaptive soundness. However, non-adaptive soundness implies adaptive soundness
using complexity leveraging; the reduction incurs a security loss of 2ℓ .
Proposition 31 ( [50]). Assuming ℓ-sub-exponential QLWE (Section 2.2), there exists a ℓ-sub-exponential
q-CCA2-secure PKE scheme.

3 Secure Software Leasing (SSL)
We present the definition of secure software leasing schemes. A secure software leasing (SSL)
scheme for a class of circuits C  {Cλ}λ∈N consists of the following QPT algorithms.
• Private-key Generation, Gen(1λ): On input security parameter λ, it outputs a private key sk.
• Software Lessor, Lessor (sk, C): On input the private key sk and a poly(n)-sized classical
circuit C ∈ Cλ, with input length n and output length m, it outputs a quantum state ρC.
• Evaluation, Run(ρC , x): On input the quantum state ρC and an input x ∈ {0, 1}n , it outputs
y, and some state ρ′
C,x
.
• Check of Returned Software, Check
(
sk, ρ∗
C
)
: On input the private key sk and the state ρ∗
C
,
it checks if ρ∗
C
is a valid leased state and if so it outputs 1, else it outputs 0.
Setup. In this work, we only consider SSL schemes in the setup model. In this model, all the
lessors in the world have access to a common reference string generated using a PPT algorithm
Setup. The difference between Setup and Gen is that Setup is run by a trusted third party whose
output is used by all the lessors while Gen is executed by each lessor separately. We note that our
impossibility result rules out SSL schemes for all quantum unlearnable class of circuits even in the
setup model.
We define this notion below.
Definition 32 (SSL with Setup). A secure software leasing scheme (Gen, Lessor,Run,Check) is said to
be in the common reference string (CRS) model if additionally, it has an algorithm Setup that on input 1λ
outputs a string crs.
Moreover, the algorithms Gen now takes as input crs instead of 1λ and Run additionally takes as input
crs.
We require that an SSL scheme, in the setup model, satisfies the following properties.
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Definition 33 (Correctness). An SSL scheme (Setup,Gen, Lessor,Run,Check) for C  {Cλ}λ∈N is ε-
correct if for all C ∈ Cλ , with input length n, the following two properties holds for some negligible function
ε:
• Correctness of Run:
Pr

∀x ∈ {0, 1}n , y  C(x) :
crs←Setup(1λ),
sk←Gen(crs),
ρC←Lessor(sk,C)(
ρ′
C,x
,y
)
←Run(crs,ρC ,x)

≥ 1 − ε
• Correctness of Check:
Pr
[
Check
(
sk, ρC
)
 1 :
crs←Setup(1λ),
sk←Gen(crs)
ρC←Lessor(sk,C)
]
≥ 1 − ε
Reusability. Adesirable property of an SSL scheme is reusability: the lessee should be able to re-
peatedly executeRunonmultiple inputs. AnSSL schemedoes notnecessarily guarantee reusability;
for instance Run could destroy the state after executing it once. But fortunately, we can transform
this scheme into another scheme that satisfies reusability.
We define reusability formally.
Definition 34. (Reusability) An SSL scheme (Setup,Gen, Lessor,Run,Check) for C  {Cλ}λ∈N is said
to be reusable if for all C ∈ C and for all x ∈ {0, 1}n ,ρ′C,x − ρC
tr
≤ negl(λ).
Note that the above requirement
ρ′C,x − ρCtr ≤ negl(λ) would guarantee that an evaluator can
evaluate the leased state onmultiple inputs; on each input, the original leased state is only disturbed
a little which means that the resulting state can be reused for evaluation on other inputs.
The following proposition states that there is a way to generically transform any SSL scheme
into one that is reusable.
Proposition 35. Let (Setup,Gen, Lessor,Run,Check) be any SSL scheme (not necessarily satisfying the
reusability condition). Then, there is a QPT algorithm Run′ such that (Setup,Gen, Lessor,Run′,Check)
is a reusable SSL scheme.
Proof. For any C ∈ C and for any x ∈ {0, 1}n , we have that Run(crs, ρC , x) outputs C(x) with
probability 1− ε. By the Almost As Good As New Lemma (Lemma 8),there is a way to implement
Run such that it is possible to obtain C(x), and then recover a state ρ˜C satisfying
ρ˜C − ρCtr ≤ √ε.
We let Run′ be this operation. 
Thus, it suffices to just focus on the correctness property when constructing an SSL scheme.
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3.1 Security
We require the following security guarantee: a QPT adversary (pirate) after receiving a leased
copy of C generated using Lessor, denoted by ρC, cannot produce a bipartite state σ
∗ on registers
R1 and R2, such that σ
∗
1
: Tr2[σ∗] can be checked (verified using Check), and the resulting post-
measurement state on R2 (after the check on R1), which we will denote by P2(σ∗), still computes
C by Run(P2(σ∗), x)  C(x). We call this perfect lessor security and the reason why we use the
word perfect here is because we require Run(P2(σ∗), x)  C(x) with overwhelming probability
on every input x. Note that Run is not necessarily deterministic (for instance, it could perform
measurements) and thus we allow it to output the incorrect value with some probability. In the
case that the adversary only gets one leased copy, we term this security notion as perfect lessor
security and the more general notion as generalized perfect lessor security.
Before formally stating the definition, let us fix some notation. We will use the following nota-
tion for the state that the pirate keeps after the initial copy has been returned and verified. If the
pirate outputs the bipartite state σ∗, then we will write
P2(sk, σ∗) ∝ Tr1 [Π1[Check(sk, ·)1 ⊗ I2 (σ∗)]]
for the state that the pirate keeps after the first register has been returned and verified. Here, Π1
denotes projecting the output of Check onto 1, and where Check(sk, ·)1 ⊗ I2(σ∗) denotes applying
the Check QPT onto the first register, and the identity on the second register of σ∗. In other words,
P2(sk, σ∗) is used to denote the post-measurement state onR2 conditioned onCheck(sk, ·) accepting
on R1.
Definition 36 (Perfect Lessor Security). We say that a SSL scheme (Setup,Gen, Lessor,Run,Check)
for a class of circuits C  {Cλ}λ∈N is said to satisfy (β, γ,DC)-perfect lessor security, with respect to a
distribution DC on C, if for every QPT adversary A (pirate) that outputs a bipartite (possibly entangled)
quantum state on two registers, R1 and R2, the following holds:
Pr

Check(sk,σ∗1)1∧
∀x, Pr[Run(crs,P2(sk,σ∗),x)C(x)]≥β
:
crs←Setup(1λ),
C←DC(λ),
sk←Gen(crs),
ρC←Lessor(sk,C),
σ∗←A(crs,ρC)
σ∗
1
Tr2[σ∗]

≤ γ
Generealized Perfect Lessor Security. It is desirable to have a stronger security guarantee where
the adversarywill not be able to create a pirated copy even after receivingmany leased copies of the
same circuit (and not just one as we considered before). We formalize this security notion, termed
as generalized perfect lessor security, below.
Similar to the perfect lessor security setting, we will use the notation Pq+1(sk, σ∗) to denote the
post-measurement state on register Rq+1 conditioned on Check(sk, ·) accepting on all registers R1
through Rq .
Definition 37 (Generalized Perfect Lessor Security). We say that a SSL scheme (Setup,Gen, Lessor,
Run,Check) for a class of circuits C  {Cλ}λ∈N is said to satisfy generalized (β, γ,DC)-perfect lessor
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security, with respect to a distributionDC on C, if for every security parameter λ ∈ N, every q  poly(λ),
every QPT adversaryA (pirate) that outputs a multipartite (possibly entangled) quantum state on registers,
R1, . . . ,Rq+1, the following holds:
Pr

Check(sk,·)⊗q(σ∗
1,...,q
)1∧
∀x, Pr[Run(crs,Pq+1(sk,σ∗),x)C(x)]≥β
:
crs←Setup(1λ),
C←DC(λ),
sk←Gen(1λ),
ρC←Lessor(sk,C),
σ∗←A
(
crs, ρ
⊗q
C
)
,
σ∗
1,...,q
Trq+1[σ∗]

≤ γ,
where Check (sk, ·)⊗q (σ∗1,...,q) denotes applying Check(sk, ·) to each register from R1 through Rq .
Remark 38. In the general (multiple-copies) setting, we can consider schemes in which correctness is not
negligbly close to 1. However, similarly to [3], an SSL scheme with generalized perfect lessor security can
always be amplified to have ε ≤ negl(λ) by providing k  Ω(λ) number of copies, ρ⊗k
C
instead of a single
one, ρC.
4 Impossibility of SSL
To prove the impossibility of SSL, we first construct de-quantizable class of circuits.
4.1 De-Quantizable Circuits: Definition
A de-quantizable class of circuits C is a class of circuits for which there is a QPT algorithm that
given any quantum circuit with the same functionality as C ∈ C, it finds a (possibly different)
classical circuit C′ ∈ C with the same functionality as C. Of course if C is learnable, then it could
be possible to just observe the input-output behavior of the quantum circuit to find such a C′. To
make this notionmeaningful, we additionally impose the requirement that C needs to be quantum
unlearnable; given only oracle access to C, any quantum algorithm can find a circuit (possibly a
quantumcircuit and anauxiliary input state ρ)with the same functionality asC withonlynegligible
probability.
Definition 39. We say that a collection of QPT algorithms, {UC , ρC}C∈C , computes C if for any C ∈ C,
with input length n and output length m, ρC is a poly(n)-qubits auxiliary state, and UC a QPT algorithm
satisfying that for all x ∈ {0, 1}n ,
Pr[UC(ρC , x)  C(x)] ≥ 1 − negl(λ),
where the probability is over the measurement outcomes of UC. We also refer to (UC , ρC) as an efficient
quantum implementation of C. A class of classical circuits C, associated with a distribution DC , is said to
be de-quantizable if the following holds:
• Efficient De-quantization: There is a QPT algorithm B such that, for any {UC , ρC}C∈C that com-
putes C, the following holds:
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Pr
[
C′∈C∧
∀x∈{0,1}n ,C(x)C′(x)
:
C←DC
C′(x)←B(UC ,ρC)
]
≥ 1 − negl(λ)
• ν-Quantum Unlearnability: For any QPT adversary A, the following holds:
Pr
[
∀x , Pr[U∗(ρ∗ , x)  C(x)] ≥ ν : C←DC(U∗ ,ρ∗)←AC(·)(1λ)
]
≤ negl(λ)
Remark 40. By the Almost As Good As New Lemma (Lemma 8), we can assume that the QPT algorithm
UC also output a state ρ
′
C,x
that is negligibly close in trace distance to ρC, i.e. for all C ∈ C and x ∈ {0, 1}n
it holds that
Pr[UC(ρC , x)  (ρ′C,x , C(x))] ≥ 1 − negl(λ)
and
ρ′C,x − ρCtr ≤ negl(λ).
Remark 41. We emphasize that the efficient de-quantization property requires that the circuit C′ output by
the adversary should be in the same circuit class C.
Remark 42. We can relax the unlearnability condition in the above definition to instead have a distribution
over the inputs and have the guarantee that the adversary has to output a circuit (U∗ , ρ∗) such that it agrees
with C only on inputs drawn from this distribution. Our impossibility result will also rule out this relaxed
unlearnability condition; however, for simplicity of exposition, we consider the unlearnability condition stated
in the above definition.
From the above definition, we can see why a de-quantizable class C cannot be copy-protected,
as there is a QPT B that takes any (UC , ρC) efficiently computing C, and outputs a functionally
equivalent classical circuit C′, which can be copied. In the following theorem we will show that
if every circuit C ∈ C have a unique representation in C, then it is also not possible to have SSL
for this circuit class. To see why we need an additional condition, lets consider a QPT pirate A
that wants to break SSL given (Run, ρC) computing C ∈ C. Then, A can run B to obtain a circuit
C′ ∈ C, but in the proccess it could have destroyed ρC, hence it wouldn’t be able to return the initial
copy. If B takes as input (Run, ρC) and outputs a fixed C′ with probability neglibly close to 1, then
by the Almost As Good As New Lemma, it could uncompute and recover ρC. The definition of
de-quantizable class does not guarantee that B will output a fixed circuit C′, unless each circuit
in the family has a unique representation in C. If each circuit has a unique representation, the
pirate would obtain C′  C with probability neglibly close to 1, and uncompute to recover ρC. At
this point, the pirate can generate its own leasing keys sk′, and run Lessor(sk′, C′) to obtain a valid
leased state ρ′
C′. The pirate was able to generate a new valid leased state for C, while preserving
the initial copy ρC, which it can later return to the lessor.
Theorem 43. Let (C ,DC) be a de-quantizable class of circuits in which every circuit in the support of DC
has a unique representation in C. Then there is no SSL scheme (Setup,Gen, Lessor,Run,Check) (in CRS
model) for C satisfying ε-correctness and (β, γ,DC)-perfect lessor security for any negligible γ, and any
β ≤ (1 − ε).
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Proof. Consider the QPT algorithmA (pirate) that is given ρC ← Lessor(sk, C) for some C ← DC.
The piratewill runB, theQPT that de-quantizes (C ,DC), on input (Run, ρC) to obtain a functionally
equivalent circuit C′ ∈ C. Because C has a unique representation in C, we have C′  C. Since
this succeeds with probability neglibly close to 1, by the Almost As Good As New Lemma 8, it
can all be done in a way such that it is possible to obtain C and to recover a state ρ˜C satisfyingρ˜C − ρCtr ≤ negl(λ). At this point, the pirate generates its own key sk′ ← Gen(crs), and prepares
ρ′
C
← Lessor(sk′, C). It outputs ρ˜C ⊗ ρ′C.
This means that ρ′
C
is a valid leased state and by correctness of the SSL scheme,
Pr
∀x ∈ {0, 1}
n , Run
(
crs, ρ′C , x
)
 C(x) :
crs←Setup(1λ),
sk′←Gen(crs),
ρ′
C
←Lessor(sk′ ,C)
 ≥ 1 − ε
Furthermore, since
ρ˜C − ρCtr ≤ negl(λ), the probability that ρ˜C passes the return check is neglibly
close to 1. Putting these together, we have
Pr

Check(sk,ρ˜C)1∧
∀x, Pr[Run(crs,ρ′C ,x)C(x)]≥1−ε
:
crs←Setup(1λ),
C←DC (λ),
sk←Gen(crs),
ρC←Lessor(sk,C),
ρ˜C⊗ρ′C←A(crs,ρC)

≥ 1 − negl(λ)

4.2 De-quantizable Circuit Class: Construction
All that remains in the proof of impossibility of SSL is the construction of a de-quantizable circuits
class (C ,DC) in which every circuit in the support of DC has a unique representation in C. We
begin with an overview of the construction.
Constructing De-Quantizable Circuits: Challenges. The starting point is the seminal work of
Barak et al. [15], who demonstrated a class of functions, where each function is associated with a
secret key k, such that: (a)Non black box secret extraction: given non black box access to any classical
circuit implementation of this function, the key can be efficiently recovered, (b) Classical Unlearn-
ability of secrets: but given black box access to this circuit, any classical adversary who can only
make polynomially many queries to the oracle cannot recover the key.
While the result of Barak et al. has the ingredients suitable for us, it falls short inmany respects:
• Theproof of nonblack box secret extraction crucially relies upon the fact thatwe are only given
a classical obfuscated circuit. In fact there are inherent difficulties that we face in adapting
Barak et al. to the quantum setting; see [9].
• As is the casewithmanynonblack box extraction techniques, the proof of Barak et al. involves
evaluating the obfuscated circuit multiple times in order to recover the secret. As is typically
the case with quantum settings, evaluating the same circuit again and again is not always
easy – the reason being that evaluating a circuit once could potentially destroy the state thus
rendering it impossible to run it again.
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• Barak et al. only guarantees extraction of secrets given non black box access to the classical
circuit implementation of the function. However, our requirement is qualitatively different:
given a quantum implementation of the classical circuit, we need to find a (possible different)
classical circuit with the same functionality.
• Barak et al.’s unlearnability result only ruled out adversaries who make classical queries to
the oracle. On the other hand, we need to argue unlearnability against QPT adversaries who
can perform superposition queries to the oracle.
Nonetheless, we show that the techniques introduced in a simplified version of Barak8 can be suit-
ably adapted for our purpose by using two tools: quantum fully homomorphic encryption (QFHE)
and lockable obfuscation. Combining QFHE and lockable obfuscation for the purpose of secret ex-
traction has been recently used in a completely different context, that of building zero-knowledge
protocols [19, 12] (and in classical setting was first studied by [17]).
Construction. We present the construction of de-quantizable circuits.
Theorem 44. Assuming the quantum hardness of learning with errors (QLWE), and assuming that there
is a QFHE that supports evaluation of arbitrary polynomial-sized quantum circuits (see 2.3), and has the
property that ciphertexts of classical poly-sized messages have poly-sized classical descriptions, there is a
de-quantizable class of circuits (C ,DC).
Proof. Wedefine a de-quantizable class of circuits C  {Cλ}λ∈N, where every circuit in Cλ is defined
as follows:
Ca,b ,r,pk,O(x):
1. If x  0 · · · 0, output QFHE.Enc (pk, a; r) |O|pk.
2. Else if x  a, output b.
3. Otherwise, output 0 · · · 0
We will suitably pad with zeroes such that all the inputs (resp., outputs) are of the same length n
(resp., of the same length m).
Let DC(λ) be the distribution that outputs a circuit from Cλ by sampling a , b , r $←− {0, 1}λ ,
then computing (pk, sk) ← QFHE.Gen(1λ), and finally computing an obfuscation O ← LO.Obf(C[
QFHE.Dec(sk, ·), b , (sk|r)]), where C is a compute-and-compare circuit.
We show that with respect to this distribution: (a) C is quantum unlearnable (Proposition 45)
and, (b) C is efficiently de-quantizable (Proposition 48).
Proposition 45. For any non-negligible ν, the circuit class C is ν-quantum unlearnable with respect toDC.
Proof. We first rule out QPT adversaries, who given black box access to the circuit, can find the
secret key sk with non-negligible probability. Once we rule out this type of adversaries, we then
show how to reduce a QPT adversary who breaks the quantum unlearnability property of the
de-quantizable class of circuits to one who finds the secret key sk; thus completing the proof.
8See [18] for a description of this simplified version.
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Claim 46. For all QPTA with oracle access to Ca,b ,r,pk,O(·) (where the adversary is allowed to make super-
position queries), we have
Pr
(a,b ,r,pk,O)←DC
[
sk ←ACa ,b ,r,pk,O
(
1λ
)]
≤ negl(λ)
Proof. Towards proving this, we make some simplifying assumptions; this is only for simplicity of
exposition and they are without loss of generality.
Simplifying Assumptions. Consider the following oracle Oa,b ,r,pk,O :
Oa,b ,r,pk,O |x〉 |z〉 

|x〉 |z ⊕ Ca,b ,r,pk,O(x)〉 , if x , 0 · · · 0
|x〉 |z〉 , if x  0 · · · 0
The first simplifying assumption is that the adversary A is given access to the oracle Oa,b ,r,pk,O ,
instead of the oracle Ca,b ,r,pk,O . In addition,A is given Enc(pk, a; r), pk, and O as auxiliary input.
The second simplifying assumption is thatA is given some auxiliary state |ξ〉, and that it only
performs computational basis measurements right before outputting (i.e. A works with purified
states).
Proof Overview. Our proof follows the basic adversary method proof technique [10]. We prove this
by induction on the number of queries. We show that after every query the following invariant is
maintained: the state of the adversary has little amplitude over a. More precisely, we argue that
the state of the adversary after the t th query, is neglibly close to the state just before the t th query,
denoted by |ψt〉. After the adversary obtains the response to the t th query, it then applies a unitary
operation to obtain the state |ψt+1〉, which is the state of the adversary just before the (t+1)th query.
This observation implies that there is another state |φt+1〉 that: (a) is close to |ψt+1〉 (here, we use
the inductive hypothesis that |φt〉 is close to |ψt〉) and, (b) can be prepared without querying the
oracle at all.
Let Ui denote the unitary thatA performs right before its i th query, and letA,X, and Y denote the
private, oracle input, and oracle output registers ofA, respectively.
Just before the t th query, we denote the state of the adversary to be:
|ψt〉 : Ut O · · ·OU1 |ψ0〉
where |ψ0〉  |ξ〉 |Enc(pk, a; r),O , pk〉 |0 · · · 0〉X |0 · · · 0〉Y is the initial state of the adversary. Let
Πa  (|a〉〈a |)X ⊗ IY,A.
Note that anyA that outputs sk with non-negligible probability can also query the oracle on a
state |ψ〉 satisfying Tr[Πa |ψ〉〈ψ |] ≥ non-negl(λ) with non-negligible probability. Since A outputs
skwith non-negligible probability, it can decryptEnc(pk, a; r), to find a and thenquery the oracle on
a. In otherwords, if there is an adversaryA that finds skwith non-negligible probability, then there
is an adversary that at some point queries the oracle with a state |ψ〉 Tr[Πa |ψ〉〈ψ |] ≥ non-negl(λ)
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also with non-negligible probability.
Hence, it suffices to show that for any adversary A that makes at most T  poly(λ) queries to the
oracle, it holds that
Pr[∀ j, Tr[Πa |ψ j〉〈ψ j |] ≤ negl(λ)] ≥ 1 − negl(λ).
This would then imply that A cannot output sk with non-negligible probability, thus proving
Claim 46.
Towards proving the above statement, consider the following claim that states that ifA has not
queried the oracle with a state that has large overlap withΠa , then its next query will also not have
large overlap with Πa .
Claim 47 (No Good Progress). Let T be any polynomial in λ. Suppose for all t < T, the following holds:
Tr
[
Πa |ψt〉〈ψt |
] ≤ negl(λ)
Then, Pr[Tr[Πa |ψT〉〈ψT |] ≤ negl(λ)] ≥ 1 − negl(λ).
Proof. For all j, let |φ j〉  U jU j−1...U1 |ψ0〉.
We will proceed by induction on T. Our base case is T  1 (just before the first query to the
oracle); that is, |ψ1〉  |φ1〉. Suppose the following holds:
Pr[Tr[Πa |ψ1〉〈ψ1 |] ≥ non-negl(λ)] ≥ non-negl(λ).
The first step is to argue that if A can prepare a state such that Tr[Πa |ψ1〉〈ψ1 |] ≥ non-negl(λ)
given Enc(pk, a; r), pk and O ← LO.Obf(C [QFHE.Dec(sk, ·), b , (sk|r)])without querying the oracle,
then it can also prepare a state with large overlap withΠa if its given the simulator of the lockable
obfuscation instead. Wewill useA (specifically, the first unitary thatA applies, U1) to construct an
adversaryB that breaks the security of lockable obfuscation. B is given a, Enc(pk, a; r), pk and O as
well as auxiliary state |ξ〉. It the prepares |ψ1,O〉  U1 |ξ〉 |Enc(pk, a; r),O , pk〉 |0 · · · 0〉X |0 · · · 0〉Y, and
measures in computational basis. If the output of this measurement is a, it outputs 1; otherwise, it
outputs 0.
Consider the following hybrids.
•Hyb1 In this hybrid, B is given a, Enc(pk, a; r), pk,O ← LO.Obf(C[QFHE.Dec(sk, ·), b , (sk|r)]).
•Hyb2: In this hybrid, B is given a, Enc(pk, a; r), pk and O ← Sim(1λ).
Since the lock b is chosen uniformly at random, by security of lockable obfuscation, the prob-
ability that B outputs 1 in the first hybrid is negligibly close to the probability that B outputs 1 in
the second hybrid. This means that if Tr[Πa |ψ1,O〉〈ψ1,O |] ≥ non-negl(λ)with non-negligible prob-
ability when O ← LO.Obf(C[QFHE.Dec(sk, ·), b , (sk|r)]), then this still holds when O ← Sim(1λ).
But we show that if Tr[Πa |ψ1,O〉〈ψ1,O |] ≥ non-negl(λ), when O is generated as O ← Sim(1λ),
then QFHE is insecure.
• Consider the followingQFHEadversarywho is given |ξ〉as auxiliary information, and chooses
twomessages m0  0 · · · 0 and m1  a, where a is sampled uniformly at random from {0, 1}λ .
It sends (m0, m1) to the challenger.
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• The challenger of QFHE then generates ctd  Enc(pk, md), for some bit d ∈ {0, 1} and sends
it to the QFHE adversary.
• The QFHE adversary computes O ← Sim(1λ).
• The QFHE adversary then prepares the state |ψd〉  U1 (|ξ〉 |ctd ,O , pk〉 |0 · · · 0〉X |0 · · · 0〉Y) and
measures register X in the computational basis.
If d  0, the probability that the QFHE adversary obtains a as outcome is negligible; since a is
independent of U1, pk, |ξ〉, and O. But from our hypothesis (Pr[Tr[Πa |ψ1〉〈ψ1 |] ≥ non-negl(λ)] ≥
non-negl(λ)), the probability that the QFHE adversary obtains a as outcome is non-negligible for
the casewhen d  1. This contradicts the security ofQFHEas the adversary can use a to distinguish
between these two cases.
To prove the induction hypothesis, suppose that for all t < T, the following two conditions hold:
1. Tr[Πa |ψt〉〈ψt |] ≤ negl(λ)
2. |〈φt |ψt〉 |  1 − δt
for some negligible δ1, ..., δT−1. We can write
|〈φT |ψT〉 |  |〈φT−1 |O |ψT−1〉 |
By hypothesis (2) above, we have |φT−1〉  (1 − δT−1)e iα |ψT−1〉 +
√
2δT−1 − δ2T−1 |ψ˜T−1〉, here α
is some phase, and |ψ˜T−1〉 is some state orthogonal to |ψT−1〉. Then
|〈φT |ψT〉 |  |(1 − δT−1)e iα 〈ψT−1 |O |ψT−1〉 +
√
2δT−1 − δ2T−1〈ψ˜T−1 |O |ψT−1〉 |
≥ |(1 − δT−1)e iα 〈ψT−1 |O |ψT−1〉 | −
√
2δT−1 − δ2T−1
≥ (1 − δT−1)|〈ψT−1 |O |ψT−1〉 | −
√
2δT−1 − δ2T−1
Byhypothesis (1) above, and since the oracle acts non-trivially only on a, we have |〈ψT−1 |O |ψT−1〉 | ≥
1 − negl(λ), which gives us
|〈φT |ψT〉 | ≥ 1 − negl(λ).
Nowwewant to show that Tr[Πa |ψT〉〈ψT |] ≤ negl(λ). This follows from the security of lockable
obfuscation and QFHE similarly to T  1 case. Since |〈φT |ψT〉 | ≥ 1 − negl(λ), we have that
Tr[Πa |φT〉〈φT |] ≤ negl(λ) ⇒ Tr[Πa |ψT〉〈ψT |] ≤ negl(λ).
From a similar argument to the T  1 case but using UTUT−1 · · ·U1 instead of just U1, we have that
Pr[Tr[Πa |φT〉〈φT |] ≤ negl(λ)] ≥ 1 − negl(λ). 
LetEi denote the event that Tr[Πa |ψi〉〈ψi |] ≤ negl(λ). Let pT be theprobability that Tr[Πa |ψt〉〈ψt |] ≤
negl(λ) for all the queries t ≤ T. Using the previous claim, we have that
35
pT 
T∏
t1
Pr[Et |∀ j < t , E j]
≥ (1 − negl(λ))T
≥ (1 − T · negl(λ))

Suppose that there is a QPT B that can learn C with respect toDC with non-negligible proba-
bility δ. In other words, for all inputs x,
Pr
[
U(ρ, x)  Ca,b ,r,pk,O(x) :
Ca ,b ,r,pk,O←DC
(U,ρ)←BCa ,b ,r,pk,O (1λ)
]
 δ
We use BCa ,b ,r,pk,O to construct a QPT ACa ,b ,r,pk,O that can find sk with probability neglibly close to
δ, contradicting Claim 46. To do this, A first prepares (U, ρ) ← BCa ,b ,r,pk,O (1λ). Then, ACa ,b ,r,pk,O
queries the oracle on input 0 · · · 0, obtaining ct1  QFHE.Enc(pk, a; r) along with pk and O 
LO.Obf(C[QFHE.Dec(sk, ·), b , (sk|r)]). Finally, it homomorphically computes ct2 ← QFHE.Eval(U(ρ, ·), ct1).
Then it computes sk′ |r′  O(ct2), and outputs sk′.
By the correctness of the QFHE and because U(ρ, a)  b holds with probability δ, we have that
QFHE.Decsk(ct2)  b with probability negligibly close to δ. By correctness of lockable obfuscation
O(ct2) will output the right message sk. This means that output ofA is sk with probability negli-
gibly close to δ.

Proposition 48. (C ,DC) is efficiently de-quantizable.
Proof. We will start with an overview of the proof.
Overview: Given a quantum circuit (UC , ρC) that computes Ca,b ,r,pk,O(·), first compute on the input
x  0 · · · 0 to obtain QFHE.Enc(pk, a; r)|O|pk. We then homomorphically evaluate the quantum
circuit on QFHE.Enc(pk, a; r) to obtain QFHE.Enc(pk, b′), where b′ is the output of the quantum
circuit on input a; this is part where we crucially use the fact that we are given (UC , ρC) and not
just black box access to the functionality computing (UC , ρC). But b′ is nothing but b! Given QFHE
encryption of b, we can then use the lockable obfuscation to recover sk; since the lockable obfusca-
tion on input a valid encryption of b outputs sk. Using sk we can then recover the original circuit
Ca,b ,r,pk,O(·). Formal details follow.
For any C ∈ C, let (UC , ρC) be any QPT algorithm (with auxiliary state ρC) satisfying that for all
x ∈ {0, 1}n ,
Pr
[
UC(ρC , x) 
(
ρ′C,x , C(x)
)]
≥ 1 − negl(λ),
where the probability is over the measurement outcomes of UC, and ρ
′
C,x
is neglibly close in trace
distance to ρC (see Remark 40). We will show how to constuct a QPT B to de-quantize (C ,DC).
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Bwill performaQFHEevaluation, whichwe describe here. GivenQFHE.Enc(pk, x), wewant to
homomorphically evaluateC(x) to obtainQFHE.Enc(pk, C(x)). Todo this, first prepareQFHE.Enc(pk, ρC , x),
then evaluate UC homomorphically to obtain the following:
QFHE.Enc(pk, ρ′C,x , C(x))  QFHE.Enc(pk, ρ′C,x)
QFHE.Enc(pk, C(x))
Consider the following QPT algorithm B that is given (UC , ρC) for any C ∈ C.
B(UC , ρC):
1. Compute (ρ′, ct1 |O′ |pk′) ← UC(ρC , 0 · · · 0).
2. Compute σ |ct2 ← QFHE.Eval(UC(ρ′, ·), ct1)
3. Compute sk′ |r′ ← O(ct2)
4. Compute a′ ← QFHE.Dec(sk′, ct1), b′ ← QFHE.Dec(sk′, ct2).
5. Output Ca′,b′,r′,pk′,O′.
We claim that with probability negligibly close to 1, (a′, b′, r′, pk′,O′)  (a , b , r, pk,O) when C :
Ca,b ,r,pk,O ← DC . This would finish our proof.
Lets analyze the outputs of B step-by-step.
• After Step (1), with probability neglibibly close to 1, we have that ct1  QFHE.Enc(pk, a; r) ,
pk′  pk, and O′  O ← LO.Obf(C[QFHE.Dec(sk, ·), b , (sk|r)]). Furthermore, we have that ρ′
is negligibly close in trace distance to ρC.
• Conditioned on Step (1) computing C(0 · · · 0) correctly, we have that QFHE.Eval(UC(ρ′, .), ct1)
computes correctlywithprobability negligibly close to 1. This is because
ρ′ − ρCtr ≤ negl(λ),
and by correctness of both QFHE and (UC , ρC). Conditioned on ct1  QFHE.Enc(pk, a; r),
when Step (2) evaluates correctly, we have ct2  QFHE.Enc(pk, C(a))  QFHE.Enc(pk, b)
• Conditioned on ct2  QFHE.Enc(pk, b), by correctness of lockable obfuscation, we have that
O(ct2)outputs sk|r. Furthermore, by correctness ofQFHE,decryption is correct: QFHE.Dec(sk, ct1)
outputs a with probability neglibly close to 1, and QFHE.Dec(sk, ct2) outputs b with proba-
bility neglibly close to 1.
With probability negligibly close to 1, we have shown that (a′, b′, r′, pk′,O′)  (a , b , r, pk,O).
Note that it is also possible to recover ρ′′ that is neglibly close in trace distance to ρC. This
is because σ  QFHE.Enc(pk, ρ′′) for some ρ′′ satisfying
ρ′′ − ρCtr. Once sk′  sk has been
recovered, it is possible to also decrypt σ and obtain ρ′′. To summarize, we have shown a QPT B
satisfying
Pr[B(UC , ρC)  (ρ′′, C) : C ← DC] ≥ 1 − negl(λ)
where
ρ′′ − ρCtr ≤ negl(λ). 

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Implications to Copy-Protection. We have constructed a class C and an associated distribution
DC that is efficient de-quantizable. In particular, this means that there is no copy-protection for C.
If for all inputs x, there is a QPT (UC , ρC) to compute UC(ρC , x)  C(x) with probability 1 − ε for
some negligible ε, then it is possible to find, with probability close to 1, a circuit C′ that computes
the same functionality as C. We also proved that (C ,DC) is quantum unlearnable. We summarize
the result in the following corollary,
Corollary 49. There is (C ,DC) that is quantum unlearnable, but C cannot be copy-protected against DC.
Specifically, for any C ← DC with input length n, and for any QPT algorithm (UC , ρC) satisfying that for
all x ∈ {0, 1}n ,
Pr[UC(ρC , x)  C(x)] ≥ 1 − ε
for some negligible ε, there is a QPT algorithm (pirate) that outputs a circuit C′, satisfying C′(x)  C(x)
for all x ∈ {0, 1}n , with probability negligibly close to 1.
Further Discussion. Notice that in our proof that C is efficient de-quantizable, we just need to
compute UC(ρC , x) at two different points x1  0 · · · 0 and x2  a, where the evaluation at x2 is
done homomorphically. This means that any scheme that lets a user evaluate a circuit C at least
2 times (for 2 possibly different inputs) with non-negligible probability cannot be copy-protected.
Such a user would be able to find all the parameters of the circuit, (a , b , r, pk,O), succesfully with
non-negligible probability, hence it can prepare as many copies of a functionally equivalent circuit
C′.
In our proof, we make use of the fact that (UC , ρC) evaluates correctly with probability close
to 1. This is in order to ensure that the pirate can indeed evaluate at 2 points by uncomputing
after it computes C(0 · · · 0). Since any copy-protection scheme can be amplified to have correctness
neglibly close to 1byprovidingmultiple copies of the copy-protected states,our result also rules out
copy-protection for non-negligible correctness parameter ε, as long as the correctness of (UC , ρC)
can be amplified to neglibily close to 1 by providing ρ⊗k
C
for some k  poly(λ).
Impossibility of QuantumVBBwith single uncloneable state. Our techniques also rule out the
possibility of quantumVBB for classical circuits. In particular, this rules the possibility of quantum
VBB for classical circuits with the obfucated circuit being a single uncloneable state, thus resolving
an open problem by Alagic and Fefferman [9].
Proposition 50. Assuming QFHE and QLWE, the following holds: there exists a circuit class C such that
there does not exist any quantum VBB for C.
Proof. We construct a circuit class C  {Cλ}λ∈N, where every circuit in Cλ is of the form Ca,b ,r,pk,O
defined in the proof of Theorem 44.
Given any quantum VBB of Ca,b ,r,pk,O , there exists an adversaryA that recovers b and outputs
the first bit of b. The adversaryA follows steps 1-4 of B defined in the proof of Proposition 48 and
then outputs the first bit of b′. In the same proof, we showed that the probability that b′  b is
negligibly close to 1 and thus, the probability it outputs the first bit of b is negligibly close to 1.
On the other hand, any QPT simulator Sim with superposition access to Ca,b ,r,pk,O can recover
b with probability negligibly close to 1/2. To prove this, we rely upon the proof of Claim 46. We
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will start with the same simplifying assumptions as made in the proof of Claim 46. Suppose T is
the number of superposition queries made by Sim to Ca,b ,r,pk,O . Let |ψ0〉 is the initial state of Sim
and more generally, let |ψt〉 be the state of Sim after t queries, for t ≤ T.
We define an alternate QPT simulator Sim′ which predicts the first bit of b with probability
negligibly close to Sim. Before we describe Sim′, we give the necessary preliminary background.
Define |φt〉  UtUt−1 · · ·U1 |ψ0〉. We proved the following claim.
Claim 51. |〈φt |ψt〉 |  1 − δt for every t ∈ [T].
Sim′ starts with the initial state |ψ0〉. It then computes |φT〉. If U is a unitary matrix Sim applies
on |ψT〉 followed by a measurement of a registerD then Sim′ also performs U on |φT〉 followed by
a measurement ofD. By the above claim, it then follows that the probability that Sim′ outputs 1 is
negligibly close to the probability that Sim outputs 1. But the probability that Sim′ predicts the first
bit of b is 1/2. Thus, the probability that Sim predicts the first bit of b is negligibly close to 1/2. 
5 qIHO for Compute-and-Compute Circuits
To complement the impossibility result, we present a construction of SSL for a subclass of evasive
circuits. Specifically, the construction works for circuit classes that have q-Input-Hiding obfusca-
tors. In the following section, we show that there are q-Input-Hiding obfuscators for Compute-
and-Compare circuits.
Barak et al. [14] present a construction of input-hiding obfuscators secure against classical PPT
adversaries; however, it is unclear whether their construction is secure against QPT adversaries.
Instead we present a construction of input-hiding obfuscators (for a class of circuits different from
the ones considered in [14]) from QLWE. Specifically, we show how to construct a q-input-hiding
obfuscator for compute-and-compare circuits Ccnc with respect to a distribution DC defined in
Definition 12.
Lemma 52 (qIHO for Compute-and-Compare Circuits). Consider a class of compute-and-compare cir-
cuits Ccnc associated with a distribution DC (Definition 12). Assuming QLWE, there exists qIHO for Ccnc.
Proof. We prove this in two steps: we first construct a qIHO for the class of point functions and
then we use this to build qIHO for compute-and-compare class of circuits.
qIHO for point functions: To prove this, we use a theorem due to [14] that states that an average-
case VBB for circuits with only polynomially many accepting points is already an input-hiding
obfuscator for the same class of circuits; their same proof also holds in the quantum setting. Any
q-average-case VBB for circuits with only polynomially many accepting points is already a qIHO.
As a special case, we have a qIHO for point functions from q-average-case VBB for point functions.
Moreover, we can instantiate q-average-case VBB for point functions fromQLWEand thus, we have
qIHO for point functions from QLWE.
We describe the formal details below. First, we recall the definition of average-case VBB.
Definition 53 (q-Average-Case Virtual Black-Box Obfuscation (VBB)). Consider a class of circuits
C  {Cλ}λ∈N associated with a distribution DC . We say that (Obf, Eval) is said to be a q-average-case
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virtualblack-boxobfucsator forC if it holds that for everyQPT adversaryA, there exists aQPT simulator
Sim such that for every λ ∈ N, the following holds for every non-uniform QPT distinguisher D:Pr [1← D (C˜) : C←DC (λ),C˜←Obf(1λ ,C)
]
− Pr
[
1← D
(
C˜
)
: C˜ ← Sim
(
1λ
)]  ≤ negl(λ),
We consider a quantum analogue of a proposition proven in [14]. We omit the proof details since
this is identical to the proof provided by [14] albeit in the quantum setting.
Proposition 54. Consider a class of evasive circuits C  {Cλ}λ∈N associated with a distribution DC such
that each circuit C ∈ Cλ has polynomially many accepting points.
Assuming q-average-case virtual black-box obfuscation for C, there is a qIHO for C.
As a special case, we have qIHO for point functions (defined below) assuming q-average-case VBB
for point functions. Moreover, q-average-case VBB for point functions can be instantiated from
QLWE (see for example [54, 38]). Thus, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 55 (q-Input-Hiding Obfuscator for Point Functions). Consider the class of circuits C 
{Cλ}λ∈N defined as follows: every circuit C ∈ C, is associated with x such that it outputs 1 on x and 0 on
all other points.
Assuming QLWE, there is a qIHO for C.
qIHO for compute-and-compare circuits from qIHO for point functions: We now show how to construct
qIHO for compute-and-compare circuits Ccnc, associated with distribution Dcnc (Definition 12),
from qIHO for point functions. Denote PO.qIHO to be a qIHO for point functions G  {Gλ}λ∈N as-
sociated with distributionDpo, whereDpo is a marginal distribution ofDcnc on {α}. We construct
qIHO for compute-and-compare circuits below; we denote this by cnc.qIHO.
cnc.qIHO.Obf
(
1λ ,C[C, α]): It takes as input security parameter λ, compute-and-compare circuit
C[C, α], associated with lock α. Compute PO.qIHO(1λ , Gα ∈ Gλ) to obtain G˜α. Output C˜ (
C, Gα(·)) .
cnc.qIHO.Eval
(
C˜, x
)
: On input obfuscated circuit C˜ 
(
C, G˜α
)
, input x, do the following:
• Compute C(x) to obtain α′.
• Compute PO.Eval
(
G˜α , α
′
)
to obtain b.
• Output b.
Claim 56. Assuming PO.qIHO is an input-hiding obfuscator for G associated with Dpo, cnc.qIHO is an
input-hiding obfuscator for C associated withDcnc.
Proof. Suppose there exists a QPT adversaryA such that the following holds:Pr
C˜(x)  1 :
C[C,α]←Dcnc(λ),
C˜←cnc.qIHO(1λ ,C[C,α]),
x←A(1λ ,C˜)

  δ
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Our first observation is that Pr
[
C(x)  α
 C˜(x)  1]  1. Using this, we can construct another
adversary A′ that violates the input-hiding property of PO.qIHO. On input Gα(·), A′ computes
A
(
C˜ 
(
C, Gα(·))) ; denote the output to be x. Finally, A′ outputs α′  C(x).
From the above observations, it holds that A′ breaks the input-hiding property of PO.qIHO
with probability δ. From the security of PO.qIHO, we have that δ  negl(λ) and thus the proof of
the claim follows.

Conclusion: Combining Claim 56 and Proposition 55, we have qIHO for compute-and-compare
circuits from QLWE.

6 Main Construction
In this section, we present the main construction of SSL; our SSL satisfies perfect lessor security
(and not the generalized lessor security).
LetC  {Cλ} be the class ofS-searchable circuits associatedwith SSL.Wedenote s(λ)  poly(λ)
to be the maximum size of all circuits in Cλ. And letDC be the distribution associated with C.
Ingredients.
1. Input-hiding obfuscator qIHO  (qIHO.Obf, qIHO.Eval) for C.
2. Subspace hiding obfuscation shO  (shO.Obf, shO.Eval). The field associated with shO is Zq
and the dimensions will be clear below.
3. q-simulation-extractable non-interactive zero-knowledge systemqseNIZK  (CRSGen,P ,V)
for NP with sub-exponential security as guaranteed in Lemma 27.
Construction. We describe the scheme of SSL below.
• Setup(1λ): Compute crs ← CRSGen (1λ1 ) , where λ1  λ + n and n is the input length of the
circuit. Output crs.
• Gen(crs): On input common reference string crs, choose a random λ2 -dimensional subspace
A ⊂ Zλq . Set sk  A.
• Lessor(sk  A, C): On input secret key sk, circuit C ∈ Cλ , with input length n,
1. Prepare the state |A〉  1√
qλ/2
∑
a∈A
|a〉.
2. Compute C˜ ← qIHO.Obf(C; ro)
3. Compute g˜ ← shO(A; rA).
4. Compute g˜⊥ ← shO(A⊥; rA⊥).
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5. Let x  S(C); that is, x is an accepting point of C.
6. Let L be the NP language defined by the following NP relation.
RL :

((
g˜, g˜⊥, C˜
)
, (A, ro , rA , rA⊥ , C, x)
) 
g˜shO(A;rA)
g˜⊥shO(A⊥;rA⊥)
C˜qIHO.Obf(C;ro),
C(x)1
 .
Compute π ← P
(
crs,
(
g˜, g˜⊥, C˜
)
, (A, r, ro , rA , rA⊥ , C, x)
)
7. Output ρC  |ΦC〉〈ΦC | 
(
|A〉〈A | , g˜, g˜⊥, C˜, π
)
.
• Run(crs, ρC , x):
1. Parse ρC as
(
ρ, g˜, g˜⊥, C˜, π
)
. In particular, measure the last 4 registers.
Note: This lets us assume that the input to those registers is just classical, since anyone about to
perform Run might as well measure those registers themselves.
2. Abusing notation, we denote the operation shO.Eval( g˜, |x〉 |y〉)  |x〉 |y ⊕ 1A(x)〉 by
g˜[|x〉 |y〉]. Compute g˜[ρ ⊗ |0〉〈0|] and measure the second register. Let a denote the
outcome bit, and let ρ′ be the post-measurement state.
3. As above, we denote the operation shO.Eval( g˜⊥, |x〉 |y〉)  |x〉 |y ⊕ 1A(x)〉 by g˜⊥[|x〉 |y〉].
Compute g˜⊥[FTρ′FT† ⊗ |0〉〈0|] and measure the second register. Let b denote the out-
come bit.
Note: in Step 2 and 3, Run is projecting ρ onto |A〉〈A | if a  1 and b  1.
4. Afterwards, perform theFourier Transformagainon thefirst register of thepost-measurement
state, let ρ′′ be the resulting state.
5. Compute c ←V
(
crs,
(
g˜, g˜⊥, C˜
)
, π
)
6. If either a  0 or b  0 or c  0, reject and output ⊥.
7. Compute y ← qIHO.Eval
(
C˜, x
)
.
8. Output
(
ρ′′, g˜, g˜⊥, C˜, π
)
and y.
• Check(sk  A, ρC):
1. Parse ρC as
(
ρ, g˜, g˜⊥, C˜, π
)
.
2. Perform the measurement {|A〉〈A | , I − |A〉〈A |} on ρ. If the measurement outcome cor-
responds to |A〉〈A |, output 1. Otherwise, output 0.
Lemma 57 (Overwhelming probability of perfect correctness.). The above scheme satisfies ǫ  negl(λ)
correctness.
Proof. Since qIHO is perfectly correct, it suffices to show that Run will not output ⊥. For this to
happen, it has to be the case that a , b , c  1. If π is a correct proof, then by perfect correctness of
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qseNIZK, we have that Pr[c  1]  1. Since g˜  shO(A) and g˜⊥  shO(A⊥), the a and b check
Run just projects the input quantum state onto |A〉〈A | (with probability negligibly close to 1, due
to correctness of shO). But the input is the state |A〉 in the first place, so a  1 and b  1 with
negligibly probability close to 1.
To see that correctness of Check holds, note that the leased state is ρ  |A〉〈A |, which will pass
the check with probability 1.

Lemma58. Fix β  µ(λ), whereµ(λ) is anynon-negligible function. Assuming the security ofqIHO, qseNIZK
and shO, the above scheme satisfies (β, γ,DC)-perfect lessor security, where γ is a negligible function.
Proof. For any QPT adversaryA, define the following event.
Process(1λ):
• crs ← Setup (1λ ) ,
• sk← Gen(crs),
• C ← DC(λ),
•
(
ρC 
(
|A〉〈A | , g˜, g˜⊥, C˜, π
))
← Lessor (sk, r)
•
(
C˜(1), g˜(1), g˜⊥
(1)
, π(1) , C˜(2), g˜(2), g˜⊥
(2)
, π(2) , σ∗
)
←A (crs, ρC)
That is, A outputs two copies; the classical part in the first copy is
(
C˜(1) , g˜(1), g˜⊥
(1)
, π(1)
)
and the
classical part in the second copy is
(
C˜(2), g˜(2), g˜⊥
(2)
, π(2)
)
. Moreover, it outputs a single densitymatrix
σ∗ associated with two registers R1 and R2; the state in R1 is associated with the first copy and the state
in R2 is associated with the second.
• σ∗
1
 Tr2[σ∗]
• ρ
(1)
C

(
σ∗1, C˜
(1), g˜(1), g˜⊥
(1)
, π(1)
) ∧
ρ
(2)
C

(
P2(sk, σ∗), C˜(2), g˜(2), g˜⊥(2) , π(2)
)
To prove the lemma, we need to prove the following:
Pr

Check
(
sk,ρ
(1)
C
)
1∧
∀x, Pr
[
Run
(
crs,ρ
(2)
C
,x
)
C(x)
]
≥β
: Process
(
1λ
)  γ
Consider the following:
• Define γ1 as follows:
Pr

Check(sk,ρ(1)
C
)1∧
∀x, Pr
[
Run
(
crs,ρ
(2)
C
,x
)
C(x)
]
≥β∧(
C˜, g˜ , g˜⊥
)

(
C˜(2) , g˜(2) , g˜⊥(2)
)
: Process
(
1λ
)
 γ1
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• Define γ2 as follows:
Pr

Check(sk,ρ(1)
C
)1∧
∀x, Pr
[
Run
(
crs,ρ
(2)
C
,x
)
C(x)
]
≥β∧(
C˜, g˜ , g˜⊥
)
,
(
C˜(2) , g˜(2) , g˜⊥(2)
)
: Process
(
1λ
)
 γ2
Note that γ  γ1 + γ2. In the next two propositions, we prove that both γ1 and γ2 are negligible
which will complete the proof of the lemma.
Proposition 59. γ1 ≤ negl(λ)
Proof. If 〈A |σ∗1 |A〉 ≤ negl(λ), wewould be done, since then theprobability thatCheck(sk, σ∗1)passes
in the first place would be negligible.
Suppose 〈A |σ∗
1
|A〉 is non-negligible. We now prove the following claim.
Claim 60. 〈A |P2(sk, σ∗)|A〉 ≤ negl(λ)
Proof. Suppose not. Then, we can use A to break quantum no-cloning. Specifically, Zhandry
[56] showed that no QPT algorithm on input (|A〉 , g˜ : shO(A), g˜⊥ : shO(A⊥)) can prepare the
state |A〉⊗2 with non-negligible probability. We will show that A allows us to do exactly this if
〈A |P2(sk, σ∗)|A〉 is non-negligible.
Consider the following adversaryB′. It runsA and thenprojects the output ofAonto (|A〉〈A |)⊗2;
the output of the projection is the output of B′.
B′(C):
1. Compute crs, sk as in the construction
2. Compute ρC ← Lessor(sk, C). Let ρC 
(
|A〉〈A | , g˜, g˜⊥, C˜, π
)
.
3. ComputeA(crs, ρC) to obtain
(
C˜(1) , g˜(1), g˜⊥
(1)
, π(1) , C˜(2), g˜(2) , g˜⊥
(2)
, π(2) , σ∗
)
.
4. Then, project σ∗ onto (|A〉〈A |)⊗2 by using g˜ and g˜⊥. Let m be the outcome of this projection,
so m  1means that the post measured state is (|A〉〈A |)⊗2.
5. Output m.
The projection (|A〉〈A |)⊗2 can be done by first projecting the first register onto |A〉〈A | and then
the second register. Conditioned on the first register passing Check, means that σ∗1 is succesfully
projected onto |A〉〈A |. By our assumption that 〈A |σ∗
1
|A〉 is non-negligible, this will happen with
non-negligible probability. Conditionedon this being the case, if 〈A |P2(sk, σ∗)|A〉 is non-negligible,
then projecting the second register onto |A〉〈A | will also succeed with non-negligible probability.
This means that m  1with non-negligible probability.
Consider the following adversary. It follows the same steps asB′ except in preparing the states
|A〉 and computing obfuscations g˜, g˜⊥; it gets these quantities as input. Moreover, it simulates
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the proof π instead of computing the proof using the honest prover. This is because unlike B′, the
adversaryB does not have the randomnessused in computing g˜ and g˜⊥ and hence cannot compute
the proof π honestly.
B(|A〉 , g˜, g˜⊥):
1. Sample randomness ro and compute C˜ ← qIHO.Obf(C; ro).
2. LetFkGen andSimbe associatedwith the simulation-extractability propetyof qseNIZK. Com-
pute (c˜rs, td) ← FkGen(1λ).
3. Compute (π, st) ← Sim
(
c˜rs, td,
(
g˜ , g˜⊥, C˜
))
4. Let ρC  (|A〉〈A | , g˜, g˜⊥, C˜, π)
5. RunA(c˜rs, ρC) to obtain
(
C˜(1), g˜(1), g˜⊥
(1) , π(1) , C˜(2), g˜(2), g˜⊥
(2) , π(2) , σ˜∗
)
.
6. Then, project σ˜∗ onto (|A〉〈A |)⊗2 by using g˜ and g˜⊥. Let m be the outcome of this projection,
so m  1means that the post measured state is (|A〉〈A |)⊗2.
7. Output m.
Note that from the q-simulation-extractability property9 of qseNIZK, it follows that the probability
that B outputs 1 is negligibly close to the probability that B′ outputs 1 because everything else is
sampled from the same distribution. This implies that B on input (|A〉 , g˜, g˜⊥) outputs |A〉⊗2 with
non-negligible probability, contradicting [56].

At this point, wewant to show that if
(
g˜(2) , g˜(2)⊥
)

(
g˜, g˜⊥
)
, and 〈A |P2(sk, σ∗)|A〉 ≤ negl(λ), then
the probability that Run(crs, P2(sk, σ∗), x) evaluates C correctly is negligible.
By correctness of shO, we have
Pr[∀x g˜(2)(x)  1A(x)] ≥ 1 − negl(λ)
Pr[∀x g˜(2)⊥ (x)  1A⊥(x)] ≥ 1 − negl(λ)
Thismeans thatwith probability negligibly close to 1, the first thing that theRun algorithmdoes
on input (P2(sk, σ∗), g˜(2) , g˜(2)⊥ , C˜, π) is to measure {|A〉〈A | , I − |A〉〈A |} on P2(sk, σ∗). If I − |A〉〈A | is
obtained, then the Run algorithm will output ⊥. By Claim 60, the probability that this happens is
neglibly close to 1. Formally, when g˜ and g˜⊥ are subspace obfuscations of A and A⊥ respectively,
the check a  1 and b  1 performed by the Run algorithm is a projection onto |A〉〈A |.
9We don’t need the full-fledged capability of q-simulation-extractability to argue this part; we only need q-zero-
knowledge property which is implied by q-simulation-extractability.
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Pr[a  1, b  1]  Tr[FT†ΠA⊥FTΠAP2(sk, σ∗)]
 Tr[|A〉〈A |P2(sk, σ∗)]
 〈A |P2(sk, σ∗)|A〉
≤ negl(λ)
where ΠA 
∑
a∈A
|a〉〈a | and ΠA⊥ 
∑
a∈A⊥
|a〉〈a |. From this, we have that Pr[Run(crs, ρ(2)
C
, x)  ⊥] ≥
1− negl(λ), and we have Pr[Run(crs, ρ(2)
C
, x)  C(x)] ≤ negl(λ)with probability neglibly close to 1.
This finishes our proof that if β is non-negligible, then γ1 ≤ negl(λ). 
Proposition 61. γ2 ≤ negl(λ).
Proof. We consider the following hybrid process.
HybProcess1(1λ):
•
(
c˜rs, td
) ← FkGen (1λ ) ,
• sk← Gen(crs),
• C ← DC(λ),
• Sample a random λ2 -dimensionall sub-space A ⊂ Zλq . Prepare the state |A〉  1√qλ/2
∑
a∈A |a〉.
• Compute g˜ ← shO (A; rA),
• Compute g˜⊥ ← shO (A⊥; rA⊥),
• Compute C˜ ← qIHO.Obf(C; ro)
• (π, st) ← Sim1
(
crs, td,
(
g˜, g˜⊥, C˜
))
• Set ρC 
(
|A〉〈A | , g˜, g˜⊥, C˜, π
)
.
•
(
C˜(1), g˜(1), g˜⊥
(1)
, π(1) , C˜(2), g˜(2), g˜⊥
(2)
, π(2) , σ∗
)
←A (crs, ρC)
• Set σ∗1  Tr2[σ∗]
• Set ρ
(1)
C

(
σ∗1 , C˜
(1), g˜(1), g˜⊥
(1)
, π(1)
)
and ρ
(2)
C

(
P2(sk, σ∗), C˜(2), g˜(2), g˜⊥(2) , π(2)
)
•
(
A∗, r∗o , r∗A , r
∗
A⊥ , C
∗, x∗
)
← Sim2
(
st,
(
g˜(2) , g˜⊥
(2)
, C˜(2)
)
, π(2)
)
.
Theproof of the following claim follows fromtheq-simulation-extractactability propertyofqseNIZK.
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Claim 62. Assuming that qseNIZK satisfies q-simulation extractability property secure against QPT ad-
versaries running in time 2n , we have:
Pr

((
g˜(2) , g˜⊥(2) ,C˜(2)
)
,
(
A∗ ,r∗o ,r∗A ,r
∗
A⊥ ,C
∗ ,x∗
))
∈R(L)∧
Check(sk,ρ(1))1∧
∀x, Pr[Run(crs,ρ(2) ,x)C(x)]≥β∧(
C˜, g˜ , g˜⊥
)
,
(
C˜(2) , g˜(2) , g˜⊥(2)
)
: HybProcess1
(
1λ
)

 δ1
Then, |δ1 − γ2 | ≤ negl(λ).
Remark 63. Note that n is smaller than the length of the NP instance and thus, we can invoke the sub-
exponential security of the seNIZK system guaranteed in Lemma 27.
Proof of Claim 62. Consider the following qseNIZK adversary B:
• It gets as input crs.
• It samples and computes (C, A, g˜, g˜⊥, C˜) as described in HybProcess1(1λ). It sends the fol-
lowing instance-witness pair to the challenger of seNIZK:((
C, A, g˜, g˜⊥, C˜
)
, ((A, ro , rA , rA⊥ , C, x)
)
,
where ro , rA , rA⊥ is, respectively, the randomness used to compute obfuscations g˜, g˜⊥ and C˜.
• The challenger returns back π.
• B then sends
(
|A〉 , g˜, g˜⊥, C˜, π
)
toA.
• A then outputs
(
C˜(1), g˜(1), g˜⊥
(1)
, π(1) , C˜(2), g˜(2), g˜⊥
(2)
, π(2) , σ∗
)
.
• B sets σ∗1  Tr2[σ∗].
• Finally, B performs the following checks:
– Verify if the first copy passes the Check algorithm: Perform the measurement {|A〉〈A | , I −
|A〉〈A |} on σ∗1. If the measurement outcome does not correspond to |A〉〈A |, output ⊥.
– Verify if second copy computes C: If the measurement above does not output ⊥, set ρ(2)
C
(
P2(sk, σ∗), C˜(2) , g˜(2), g˜⊥(2) , π(2)
)
. For every x, check if Run(crs, ρ(2)
C
, x)  C(x). If for any
x, the check fails, output ⊥. // Note that this step takes time 2O(n+log(n)).
– Verify if the classical parts are different: Check if
(
C˜ , g˜, g˜⊥
)
,
(
C˜(2), g˜(2), g˜⊥
(2)
)
, output ⊥.
• Output
((
g˜(2) , g˜⊥
(2)
, C˜(2)
)
, π(2)
)
.
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Note that B is a valid qseNIZK adversary: it produces a proof on an instance different from one
for which it obtained a proof (either real or simulated) and moreover, the proof produced by B
(conditioned on not ⊥) is an accepting proof.
IfB gets as input honestCRSandhonestly generatedproofπ then this corresponds toProcess1(1λ)
and ifB gets as input simulatedCRSand simulatedproofπ then this corresponds toHybProcess1(1λ).
Thus, from the security of q-simulation-extractable NIZKs, we have that |γ− δ1 | ≤ negl(λ). 
We first prove the following claim.
Claim 64.(((
g˜(2), g˜⊥
(2)
, C˜(2)
)
,
(
A∗, r∗o , r
∗
A , r
∗
A⊥ , C
∗, x∗
) ) ∈ R(L) ∧ ∀x , Pr [Run (crs, ρ(2)
C
, x
)
 C(x)
]
≥ β
)
⇒ C(x∗)  1,
Proof. We first claim that ∀x , Pr
[
Run
(
crs, ρ
(2)
C
, x
)
 C(x)
]
≥ β implies that C˜(2) ≡ C, where ≡
denotes functional equivalence. Suppose not. Let x′ be an input such that C˜(2)(x′) , C(x′) then this
means thatRun(crs, ρ(2)
C
, x′) alwaysoutputs avaluedifferent fromC(x′); follows fromthedescription
of Run. This means that Pr[Run
(
crs, ρ
(2)
C
, x′
)
 C(x′)]  0, contradicting the hypothesis.
Moreover,
((
g˜(2), g˜⊥
(2) , C˜(2)
)
,
(
A∗, r∗o , r∗A , r
∗
A⊥ , C
∗, x∗
))
∈ R(L) implies that C˜(2)  qIHO(1λ , C∗; r∗o)
and C∗(x∗)  1. Furthermore, perfect correctness of qIHO implies that C˜(2) ≡ C∗.
So far we have concluded that C˜(2) ≡ C, C˜(2) ≡ C∗ and C∗(x∗)  1. Combining all of them
together, we have C(x∗)  1.

Consider the following inequalities.
δ1  Pr

((
g˜(2) , g˜⊥(2) ,C˜(2)
)
,
(
A∗ ,r∗o ,r∗A ,r
∗
A⊥ ,C
∗ ,x∗
))
∈R(L)∧
Check(sk,ρ(1)
C
)1∧
∀x, Pr
[
Run
(
crs,ρ
(2)
C
,x
)
C(x)
]
≥β∧(
C˜, g˜ , g˜⊥
)
,
(
C˜(2) , g˜(2) , g˜⊥(2)
)
: HybProcess1

 Pr

C(x∗)1∧
Check(sk,ρ(1)
C
)1∧(
C˜, g˜ , g˜⊥
)
,
(
C˜(2) , g˜(2) , g˜⊥(2)
)
: HybProcess1

≤ Pr [C (x∗)  1 : HybProcess1]
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Let Pr [C (x∗)  1 : HybProcess1]  δ2.
Claim 65. Assuming the q-input-hiding property of qIHO, we have δ2 ≤ negl(λ)
Proof. Suppose δ2 is not negligible. Thenwe construct aQPT adversaryB that violates the q-input-
hiding property of qIHO, thus arriving at a contradiction.
B now takes as input C˜ (an input-hiding obfuscator of C), computes (c˜rs, td) ← FkGen (1λ)
and then computes ρC 
(
|A〉 , g˜, g˜⊥, C˜, π
)
as computed in HybProcess1. It sends
(
c˜rs, ρC
)
to A
who respondswith
(
C˜(1), g˜(1), g˜⊥
(1)
, π(1) , C˜(2), g˜(2), g˜⊥
(2)
, π(2) , σ∗
)
. Compute
(
A∗, r∗o , r∗A , r
∗
A⊥ , C
∗, x∗
)
by generating Sim2(st, ( g˜(2) , g˜⊥(2) , C˜(2)), π(2)), where st is as defined in HybProcess1. Output x∗.
Thus, B violates the q-input-hiding property of qIHO with probability δ2 and thus δ2 has to be
negligible. 
Combining the above observations, we have that γ2 ≤ negl(λ) for some negligible function negl.
This completes the proof.


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